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ABSTRACT 
Stephanie Watson-Grant: Measuring Country Ownership and its relationship to Health 
Outcomes: The case of Liberia 
(Under the direction of Sandra B. Greene) 
 
The concept of country ownership, in the international development aid context is not a 
new one; it is an essential international development aid component. The structure of 
development aid assumes a relationship between donor and recipient with the intention of 
creating goods or services to improve the socio-economic situation in a recipient country.  But 
while country ownership’s value is assumed to be beneficial, country ownership’s effect is 
unknown. There is no universally accepted definition, and secondly, no systematic measurement 
of the concept has been developed. 
The study aims are: 1) develop a measure of country ownership test if the performance 
based financing (PBF) system implemented by the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, and 
supported by the US Government, can be referred to as ‘country owned’; 2) assess if health 
outcomes have improved in Liberia; 3) determine intervening variables that could test a 
connection between country ownership and health outcomes; and 4) develop a plan for change.  
This study used a mixed methods approach, first the concept of country ownership was 
defined, and then country ownership of the PBF system in Liberia was measured. Second, 
secondary data analysis was done to determine if health outcomes have improved. Third, a 
qualitative assessment was done to suggest intervening variables that could be used to detect a 
connection between country owned PBF process and improved health outcomes. Therefore, the 
methodological approach is aligned to the aims of the study. 
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The study’s key findings are the PBF scheme in Liberia can be referred to as being 
country owned; health outcomes examined have not improved and variables for detecting a 
connection between a country-owned PBF scheme and health outcomes are already being 
measured within the context of the country ownership of the PBF scheme, so essentially there are 
no intervening variables.  
The plan for change includes specific policy recommendations to improve the ownership 
of the PBF process for Liberian donors and recipients. The recommendations are grounded in the 
leadership principle of power and influence, which examines power relationships and processes 
of influence towards achieving effective outcomes and is framed around Kotter’s Steps for 
Transformational Change. 
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CHAPTER 1: OVERVIEW AND INTRODUCTION 
Study Aims 
 
Objective: The concept of country ownership, in the context of international 
development aid is not a new one; in fact it is an essential component of international 
development aid. The annual provision of billions of dollars in aid by developed countries to 
developing countries assumes the products and processes that a donor provides are priorities for 
developing countries; that they will participate in the implementation of the initiative; and 
maintain and sustain the products and processes after the donor countries have discontinued their 
support. The structure of development aid further assumes that with the interest and participation 
of the recipient country, ‘owning’ an aid funded initiative will lead to more successful outcomes. 
Recipients will make decisions and take necessary steps, beyond what is detailed in program 
documents, in order to ensure successful outcomes.  
This relationship between donor and recipient is the context of country ownership; the 
transfer of funds from donor to recipient; the interplay of power, capacity, accountability, and 
responsibility between donor and recipient; with the intention of creating goods or services to 
improve the socio-economic situation in a recipient country.  But while the value of country 
ownership is assumed to be beneficial, the effect of country ownership is unknown. There is no 
2 
 
universally accepted definition, and secondly, no systematic measurement of the concept has 
been developed.    
The primary objective of this study is to develop a definition of country ownership and 
measure it in a developing country within the context of a distinct aid funded program.  Lofa 
County in Liberia was selected as the geographical focus of the study and the health sector 
performance based contracting has been chosen as the aid funded program. A secondary 
objective was to determine what intervening variables1 would best demonstrate a connection 
between country-owned performance based contracting and health outcomes. 
There were four aims to this research: 
 Aim 1: Develop a measure of country ownership.  The idea of country ownership is 
multi-dimensional, intricate, and complex; therefore an over-simplified, prosaic definition is 
woefully inadequate in describing it. The measurement of country ownership is divided in two 
parts.  
Part A: Through a systematic literature review, predominant themes that writers and 
practitioners use to describe the concept have been identified. These themes are the basis for the 
measurement of the concept. 
Part B: A parallel exercise (to this study) is underway, implemented by the MEASURE 
Evaluation Project of the Carolina Population Center. They are developing a tool to measure 
country ownership of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems. The Country Ownership of 
M&E Systems Measurement tool was adapted and used in Liberia to test if the performance 
                                                          
1 Intervening variables stand between independent and dependent variables and mitigates the effects of the 
independent variable on the dependent variable. (Creswell, 2009) 
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based contracting system implemented by the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, and 
supported by the US Government, can be referred to as ‘country owned’. 
Aim 2: Assess if health outcomes have improved in Liberia. A literature review was 
done to provide evidence that an association between performance based contracting and health 
outcomes has been found in other country contexts. This association led to a rational expectation 
that the performance based contracting system in Liberia led to improved health outcomes. 
Therefore, four health outcomes were examined before and after the introduction of performance 
based contracting, so as to determine if the health outcomes improved. These data were extracted 
from secondary data sources, the Liberia Health Information System and the Lofa County Lot 
Quality Assurance Sampling Survey. 
Aim 3: Determine intervening variables that could test a connection between 
country ownership and health outcomes. Based on results from aims 1 and 2, aim 3  explored 
what intervening variables future researchers may consider if they wanted to explore a 
connection between country ownership of Performance Based Contracting and health outcomes. 
Qualitative methods, that is, key informant interviews, were used. 
Aim 4: Develop a plan for change. The plan for change includes specific policy 
recommendations to improve the ownership of the performance-based contracting process for 
Liberian donors and recipients. The recommendations are grounded in the leadership principle of 
power and influence, which examines power relationships and processes of influence towards 
achieving effective outcomes and is framed around Kotter’s Steps for Transformational Change. 
Proposal Contribution and Significance: This research project contributes to a growing 
discourse on country ownership in the context of development aid. Its significance is that it 
attempts to measure this concept using performance based contracting process, which has not 
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been done previously.  This project also sought to document testable intervening variables for 
connecting the country ownership of the performance-based contracting to health outcomes. 
Therefore, this research sought to raise the issue of country ownership from merely theoretical to 
more concrete. 
Research question 
 How can country ownership be measured and what relationship might it have with health 
outcomes? 
Conceptual Model 
The model underpinning this research activity is that country ownership of the PBC process 
in Liberia is identified by looking at issues of: 
1. Power, legitimacy and respect (i.e. joint decision making, agreement on source of 
funding, level of funding and duration of funding), and that national systems are used in 
the delivery of the PBC process;  
2. Responsibility and commitment (i.e. that internal leadership and management structures 
are established and that donor support is known and committed  for a defined period of 
time);  
3. Capacity; that there are competent human resources dedicated to the PBC process and 
where there are gaps identified, there is a plan to fill those gaps and that technical 
assistance is provided in the interim;  
4. Accountability (i.e. that health outcome indicators are jointly agreed, outcomes are 
periodically assessed and that donors provide timely information to recipients on changes 
in the donor funding environment that may impact the success of this initiative). 
 
5 
 
 
Figure 1 - Study Conceptual Model 
 The model further assumes that these country ownership issues contribute to improved 
health outcomes. However, this connection of a country-owned PBC process to improved health 
outcomes is untested and therefore unknown. This study will explore intervening variables for 
such a connection. 
Methodological Approach 
This research project used a mixed methods approach; the quantitative methods 
supported the qualitative methods. It used sequential explorative strategy; first the concept of 
country ownership was defined, then country ownership of the performance based contracting 
system in Liberia was measured. Second, secondary data analysis was done to determine if 
health outcomes have improved. Third, a qualitative assessment was done to suggest intervening 
variables that could be used to detect a connection between country owned performance based 
contracting process and improved health outcomes. Therefore, the methodological approach is 
aligned to the aims of the study. 
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Delimitation 
The main limitation is that only one country, Liberia, and one county in Liberia, Lofa, 
was examined. This limitation means that the findings from the study are applicable only to Lofa 
County in Liberia. However, this study may have methodological implications that extend far 
beyond this limited context. 
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Introduction 
Country Ownership and International Development Assistance 
 International development aid is a multi-billion dollar industry. It is estimated that in 
2011, $133 billion (US) was made available for development assistance, from twenty-three (23) 
countries (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2012). Other sources of 
aid, e.g. charities and foundations, have further expanded this industry well beyond the 
assistance of the major donor governments. International development aid exists because some 
countries cannot independently provide goods and services for their citizens. Whether this 
assistance is motivated by politically defined self-interest or altruism, richer countries have 
created a system designed to provide needed goods and services, while achieving or protecting 
their own interests.   
 One of the major assumptions central to international development is that once a donor 
provides resources to build infrastructure or systems then the recipient country will take these 
systems, maintain and sustain them as their own. However, there are many extant forces that 
serve to complicate this assumption. It assumes recipients and donors are agreed on what is 
provided, that there are appropriate resources in recipient countries to receive and sustain what is 
provided, and that what is provided is appropriate for filling the assessed gap. 
 There has always been the idea of ‘country ownership’ in development aid. The provision 
of funding, goods and services was not sufficient to ensure sustainable capacities, structures, 
process and outcomes in developing countries. There are active collaborative roles that both 
recipient and donor must play in the process for the outcome to be successful.  
The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) tried to foster country 
ownership through conditionalities attached to their financing mechanisms. Twinning the 
8 
 
provision of financing with what external experts defined as best for a particular country not only 
stigmatized the idea of country ownership in the 1980s and 1990s, it also created confusion about 
whether it was an economic  or political concept or both (Best, 2007). Further, the solutions to 
development issues came from external experts and there was limited contribution from 
developing countries in resolving their developmental challenges.  As the development 
approaches of the World Bank and IMF failed to yield the expected developmental outcomes at 
the close of the twentieth century, the concept of country ownership had limited mention in 
development discourse. 
Then on March 2, 2005, approximately ninety-one (91) countries gathered in Paris, to 
discuss the way international development aid is delivered and managed. These countries 
represented both the donor and development aid recipient communities. This meeting not only 
reignited the concept of country ownership but de-stigmatized it. Participants committed to 
harmonized development strategies; to use and improve country level systems, where 
appropriate; and to deliver and manage aid to meet development objectives (OECD, 
2005&2008).   
In 2009, the Obama administration launched the Global Health Initiative (GHI), an 
integrated approach to unify the United States Government’s (USG) international health 
investments (US State Department, 2009).  Country ownership is one of the seven (7) principles 
that guide the GHI.  Discussions have therefore begun, within and among USG assisted health 
activities of how to assess the contribution that country ownership, as a policy principle, makes 
to improved health outcomes.  
One of the challenges with this assessment is that country ownership is not easily 
defined. As there are many parts to international health financing and the delivery of health 
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services in recipient countries, there are also many dimensions or component parts of country 
ownership. The challenge becomes even more acute when viewing it from the perspective of 
recipient countries that vary in their development status, governance systems and access to 
funding; and the perspectives of the donors with their differing interests, outcomes, systems and 
levels of resources. Although there has been considerable discussion on the issue of country 
ownership and the value of the principle is assumed, there has been no comprehensive definition 
of the concept, or testing of the idea that its existence has a positive influence on an outcome of 
interest. 
Country ownership is once again at the forefront of development policy because in this 
era of donor economic crises and shrinking development funding, the need to objectively know if 
and when countries are transitioning to sustainable country systems and processes is vital.  
Study Site: Liberia 
Rationale for selecting Study Site 
 In September 2011, the United Stated Agency for International Development (USAID) in 
Liberia executed a $42M grant agreement with the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare 
(MOHSW) focused mainly on performance-based contracting for the delivery of health services. 
Previously, a large health project, Rebuilding Basic Health Services (RBHS), implemented by 
John Snow Inc. (JSI) had been charged with managing contracts to non-government 
organizations (NGO) who deliver health services at the facility and community levels.  The 
objective of this grant is to transition the management of Liberian health services away from 
external development partners to the Liberian government.  
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Lofa County in Liberia provides a good test subject for measuring country ownership and 
determining intervening variables that could test a relationship between a country-owned PBC 
system and health outcomes.  Firstly, the MOHSW PBC system is newly implemented in Lofa 
County, having been awarded in December 2011; secondly, the post-conflict setting has meant 
heavy donor investment and involvement in rebuilding national systems; thirdly, there is a data 
available to determine if health outcomes have improved since the start of the PBC process.  
Background 
Liberia is located on the West Coast of Africa, with Guinea to the North, Cote d’Ivoire to 
the East, Sierra Leone to the West, and the Atlantic Ocean to the South. It is a small country, 
comparable to the size of the state of Tennessee in the United States of America (USA).  
 
 
Figure 2 – Map of Liberia  
Independent since 1847, Liberia was engulfed in a 14-year civil war that began in 1989 
and ended in 2003. In 2008, Liberia’s population was estimated at 3.5 million people (LISGIS, 
2009). The population is divided almost equally between the male and female and has a density 
of 93 persons per square mile of land (LISGIS et al, 2008).  Approximately 61 percent of the 
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population is below the age of 35 and the annual population growth rate is 2.1 percent, with the 
total population of Liberia expected to double the 2008 number in 33 years (i.e. by 2041) if this 
observed annual growth rate continues (LISGIS, 2009). 
Education is still a challenge and remains weak in Liberia. The literacy rate is estimated 
to be 58.1 percent (for age 15 and older), with more literate males (63.3 percent) than females 
(53 percent). The gross enrollment ratio (GER)2 varies at different levels of education 
(UNESCO, 2010).  
Liberia is a very poor country with a market-based economy. For a few years in the 
1970s, Liberia's per capita income was equivalent to that of Japan (GlobalSecurity.org).  But 
currently, Liberia is ranked by the World Bank among the very poorest countries in the world 
(World Bank, 2010). Before 1990, the country focused on curative and tertiary health care that 
was concentrated in cities and away from the largely preventable health issues that the country 
faced. Some key effects were high infant, child, and maternal mortality, and a low life 
expectancy (Bureau of Statistics, 1986). 
The war, which ended in 2003, worsened the health situation in Liberia and caused 
substantial setbacks. The country’s infrastructure collapsed and the government was unable to 
provide basic services. One key example is of the 293 public health facilities operating before the 
war, 242 were non-functional at the end of the war because buildings were destroyed and 
equipment and supplies looted (Kruk, 2010). Doctors, nurses and other health workers fled the 
country, leaving 30 physicians to attend to a population of 3 million (Kruk, 2010).  
 There have been improvements over the last eight years in the health sector and this 
progress has resulted in changes that can be seen in key health indicators, e.g. the infant 
                                                          
2 Gross Enrollment Ration (GER) is the number of pupils enrolled in a given level of education regardless of age expressed as a 
percentage of the population in the theoretical age group for that level of education. 
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mortality rate dropped from 117 to 72 deaths per 1000 live births, and under-5 mortality also 
dropped from 194 to 111 deaths per 1000 live births (World Bank, 2010). However, there remain 
significant challenges to the health sector and health outcomes continue to perform below 
required standards. 
Performance Based Contracting in Liberia  
In 2006, the Government of Liberia developed a National Health Policy and a National 
Health Plan. The National Health Plan (2007 – 2011) prioritized a Basic Package of Health 
Services (BPHS) and decentralization of management, and implementation of programs to the 15 
counties. To support the implementation of the health policy and plan, a Health Sector Pool Fund 
was established in 2008 and currently has four main contributing donors: The United Nations 
Children Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), the United 
Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) and Irish Aid (Hughes, 2012). 
Further, the MOHSW initiated performance-based financing (PBF) for health service 
delivery throughout the country funded by the Health Sector Pool Fund. The 2008 Policy on 
Contracting aims to maintain and improve access to, and quality of, the MOHSW-approved 
BPHS package. Moreover, it aims to “leverage partner capacity to prepare the County Health 
Teams to resume management of health facilities and the workforce” (MOHSW, 2007). The 
MOHSW views the contracting of NGOs as a means to facilitate the transition from relief to 
development by improving the management of, and collaboration with, the County Health and 
Social Welfare Teams (CHSWTs), which are responsible for managing health services in their 
respective counties. The capacity of CHSWTs is to be developed, in part, through the PBCs with 
the NGOs (MOHSW, 2007).  
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 The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in Liberia is 
funding a similar PBC process with the objective of transitioning the rebuilding of US 
government funded health services to the Liberian government.  The PBC process is part of an 
up to $42 million (US) Fixed Amount Reimbursement Agreement (FARA) to support the 
implementation of the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare’s National Health Policy and Plan 
2011-2021. USAID has committed funding until June 2015.  
 Under the ‘Procurement of Preventative and Curative Health Services and Commodities’ 
section of the FARA, the MOHSW will assume the management of PBCs with NGOs 
implementing the Essential Package of Health Services (EPHS) in Lofa, Bong and Nimba 
counties. Therefore, this section replaced a previous arrangement where support to service 
delivery was provided through a US-based Cooperating Agency, John Snow Inc. This new 
arrangement, directly with the MOHSW, is part of USAID’s Forward initiative that seeks to 
strengthen country partner capabilities towards the achievement and sustainability of national 
systems (Hughes, 2012). 
 The Health Sector PBF system has three models; 1) contracts between the MOHSW and 
a CHSWT; 2) contracts between the MOHSW and NGO or civil society organizations; and 3) a 
performance agreement between an implementing partner and a health facility (MOHSW, 2012). 
These models can have different approaches. For example, the MOHSW to NGO/CSO could be 
based on management contracting, that is the contractor provides only management services over 
government funds or contracting out, that is where the contracted partners have complete 
authority and autonomy to use resources to provide health services (MOHSW, 2012).  
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 The MOHSW refers to their national scheme as PBF, since it includes PBC models as 
well as PBF models. They define the difference as; PBCs are contracts with NGOs “with 
payment depending on achievement of a performance measure that includes coverage targets and 
quality norms for a set of services. The contrast with PBF is that the latter concentrates on 
agreements with providers” (MOHSW, 2012). For the purposes of this study, PBF will be used 
to describe the model in Lofa and the system in general. 
 The PBF model in Bomi is an example of the MOHSW contracting with a CHSWT and 
the Lofa model is an example of a PBC with MOHSW contracting with an NGO based on the 
management services approach. There is little model differentiation by funder, i.e. both the 
USAID and Pool Funds have supported the implementation the ‘contracting in’ model, that is, 
the MOHSW contracting with a CHSWT. This model is implemented in Bomi (Pool Fund 
supported) and Bong (USAID supported) counties.  
The PBF intervention in Lofa County is implemented through International Rescue 
Committee (IRC) which successfully won a competitive bid issued by the Government of 
Liberia’s procurement process. IRC is responsible for implementing the EPHS in 42 of the 48 
clinics in Lofa County. The EPHS “includes all elements of the Basic Package of Health 
Services (maternal, child and newborn health, communicable diseases, reproductive and 
adolescent health, mental health and emergency care), as well as a phased-expansion to include 
non-communicable diseases, essential child nutrition, neglected tropical diseases, environmental 
and occupation health, school health, eye health and prison health” (MOHSW, 2012).  
The performance targets are agreed upon and set by the MOHSW and IRC in Lofa 
County. According to the MOHSW Performance Based Financing Manual, after the targets are 
agreed upon by the MOHSW, IRC and the Lofa County Health and Social Welfare Team, IRC 
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sets a target with health facilities according to catchment population of the health facility, 
historical performance, geographical constraints; and ensures that each facility equitably 
contributes to the agreed target (MOHSW, 2012).  
There is a verification process at community, health facility and county levels. This 
verification process at the health facility and county levels is the responsibility of the PBF 
Steering Committee and is conducted once per quarter. The county contracts an external entity to 
conduct the community verification. The MOHSW then conducts a counter verification of 
administrative indicators to ensure the integrity of the results and hires a party external to the 
MOHSW to conduct the counter verification of the facility indicators. 
90% of the contract amount is paid to IRC with a 10% bonus paid when the targets are 
met and/or exceeded. This 10% is disbursed to the facility with the “recommendation… [that] up 
to 65% of the earned bonus ...be used for staff motivation, while accounting for certain criteria 
such as: base salary, responsibility, years of experience, absenteeism from work, etc. The 
remaining 35% of the earned bonus can then be used for innovative activities that are likely to 
improve the performance towards achieving a set goal” (MOHSW, 2012). 
 The transition to country managed health services will see Liberian management of PBF, 
which, it is hoped will lead to improved monitoring and evaluation of health outcomes and 
results.  The idea with the implementation of PBF is that greater recipient country management 
of EPHS will mean a greater sense of responsibility for health service delivery. This greater 
sense of responsibility will mean programs are implemented and quickly adjusted, which will 
contribute to improvements in health outcomes.   
PBF assumes that twinning remuneration and incentives to performance will improve 
performance. PBF is seen as an objective means of assessing the performance of partners, 
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holding them accountable for the services they deliver with payment as the ‘carrot’ or the ‘stick’.   
But what is being touted as a country owned process may be missing critical elements or 
dimensions. This gap could hinder full transition to the sustained delivery of health services by 
Liberians and improved or maintained health outcomes.  
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CHAPTER 2: AIM 1 - DEVELOP A MEASUREMENT APPROACH TO COUNTRY 
OWNERSHIP 
Introduction 
 The purpose of this chapter is to develop a measure of country ownership and assess if 
the performance based financing system in Lofa County, Liberia can be referred to as country 
owned. 
Part A: Define country ownership - Methods 
 The key concept examined in this literature review was Country ownership. This phrase 
is one that has relied on intuitive interpretation that is, it is more recognizable than definable. It 
assumes that there is a development financing arrangement between a donor and a recipient 
country and conjures up pictures of accountability, country leadership,  decision making by 
country officials, participation in development processes by government and civil society actors, 
and hopes of sustained programs and systems.  
 But the dimensions are not defined and agreed. This literature review will provide the 
basis for defining the dimensions or parameters of country ownership. 
Search Strategy 
The dimensions of country ownership are taken from several disciplines including, but 
not limited to; Political Science, Economics, International Political Economy and Health.  
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Therefore the search for literature on country ownership was divided into three parts and 
two tiers.  
In December 2011, a general search using the term ‘country ownership’ was used in the 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill’s (UNC’s) ‘E-Research Tools’ , which provided 
access to over 350 databases and collections including PubMed, Web of Science, JSTOR Arts & 
Sciences Collection and Wiley InterScience Journals.  
Next, a search of gray literature (lectures, conference material, technical reports, policy 
papers and speeches) of the term ‘country ownership’ was done using the Google search engine.  
Third, the articles used for a literature review on country ownership recently conducted by ICF 
International for a Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) project, was reviewed. 
A second tier search was conducted; from the appropriate material found using all three 
search engines, the reference pages were searched to ascertain additional literature.  
Criteria for Selection 
All publications included in the first tier search were selected using the following criteria: 
• Scholarly publications including peer reviewed journals (UNC E-research tools and 
Google) 
• Published after June 2005 
• Published in English 
• Journal articles and gray literature must provide a definition or description of ‘country 
ownership’  
For the second tier search, the literature must have included a definition or description of 
‘country ownership’. Beyond this there are no limiting criteria. 
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Literature was excluded if: 
• The discussion of country ownership was not within the context of development 
supported initiatives and development funding 
• The discussion was of a domestic nature within a donor country e.g. country ownership 
of health reform in the US 
• The discussion was within the private sector and multinational corporations with holdings 
in developing countries 
Process for Reviewing Literature 
Articles were reviewed first looking for the search term (‘country ownership’,) in the title 
of the articles or literature. In most cases, appropriate literature did not have abstracts and 
therefore the entire article was read to find a description or definition of the dimensions of 
country ownership.   
Literature Review Findings 
Overview  
The search was conducted from January to April 2012. 69 distinct articles were found 
using the UNC E-Research Tool, Google and ICF Literature Review.  
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Figure 3 - Country Ownership Literature inclusion Process 
The titles of 69 pieces of literature were screened and 14 of those excluded. The 55 
pieces of literature remaining were reviewed and 25 excluded because they mentioned, but did 
not offer a definition or description of country ownership, and were newspaper articles reporting 
forums where country ownership was discussed. Therefore, 30 articles met the inclusion criteria 
for ‘country ownership’.  
Key Assumption 
In all of the literature reviewed, the authors write of country ownership within the setting 
of development or foreign aid. Therefore, there is a key assumption that underpins all the 
dimensions of country ownership. It is only within the context of development aid, development 
cooperation and the donor-recipient relationship does this concept of ‘country ownership’ live.  
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This setting consists of the transfer of funds from a developed country or multilateral 
organization to a developing country for the purpose of rebuilding, strengthening or maintaining 
systems in those developing countries.  
The idea of development aid came to prominence at the end of World War II with the US 
Government’s ‘Marshall Plan’ or European Economic Recovery Program as it was officially 
known. The ‘Marshall Plan’s’ main purpose was to rebuild Europe after the devastation of World 
War II and do so in a way that engendered cooperation and reconciliation (Fuhrer, 1996).  
After the success of this Plan, the US Government expanded its assistance beyond 
European countries into Africa, Asia and Latin America. Neutral nations were promised rapid 
industrialization, akin to that of Europe, in exchange for Cold War allegiance and development 
funding (Easterly, 2010). The initial ‘Marshall’s Plan’ recipient countries in Europe and the US 
formed what was to become the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), presently the largest collective of donor countries (Fuhrer, 1996) 3.  
Currently, aid provided by foreign sources continues to be the primary avenue through 
which strategic and emergency development initiatives are funded and implemented in many 
developing countries. Developing countries experience inherent vulnerabilities: natural disasters 
for which there are little or no resources for recovery; political instability stemming from civil 
and international wars; inability to compete on the world market because of the size of their 
markets or the lack of diversification of national production.  
These vulnerabilities result in weak national systems that tend to be incapable of 
independently addressing the needs of its citizens. 
                                                          
3 In addition, some donor countries formed their own international development agencies. Even though the British 
Department for International Development was not established until 1997, the modern era of British development 
aid began in 1960 with a white paper discussing how economic development will lift poor nations out of poverty; 
USAID was established in 1961; and Canadian International Development Agency was established in 1968.  
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Donor countries are motivated to contribute to the improvement of developing countries 
because of humanitarian and utilitarian reasons. In response to the abject poverty being 
experienced by some countries, donors believe that there are common problems and therefore 
common solutions. This belief in turn engenders a sense of responsibility and solidarity. Donor 
countries are also motivated by self-interest and foreign policy imperatives, as instability and 
poverty are seen to be of strategic importance and therefore present increased security concerns 
for the developed donor countries (Besson, 2009).  
Sustained development in much of the world, through development aid, failed to have the 
same blanket effect as it did in Europe in the same number of years. Moyo (2009) discusses the 
eras of aid as beginning with the newly formed Bretton Woods institutions (World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund) in the 1940s; to the era of nation building and industrialization in 
the 1960s; to the time of aid as an instrument of poverty reduction and political alignment in the 
1970s; to aid as a tool of stabilization and structural adjustment in the 1980s; to aid as a means of 
bolstering democracy and governance in the 1990’s; to the current era of aid as the main solution 
of all development issues. 
Throughout these eras of development, the issue of ownership has come to matter. In 
development aid programming, all contingencies and eventualities cannot be foreseen, therefore 
remedies for these contingencies cannot be written into the program documents. When a program 
is ‘owned’ by a country, decisions can be made quickly and favorably for the success of the 
program, necessary local resources will be allocated and there will be domestic support for the 
sustainability of the program (Khan, 2001; Johnson, 2005; Goldberg, 2012).  
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Four (4) dominant themes of country ownership were found from this literature review 
using template analysis approach. This approach identifies key words that are then grouped and 
coded into themes (King, 2004). They are discussed below. 
 
Power and Legitimacy and Respect 
The concept of country ownership is inherently a political concept (Besson, 2009; Booth, 
2011). In development aid there is a donor-recipient relationship which Khan (2001) discusses in 
the context of a principal-agent relationship. This relationship is governed by a power dynamic 
where the donor’s power is seen as constructive (power to act) and the recipient’s power is seen 
as controlling (power over a player or a process) (Hyden, 2008). Humanitarian and utilitarian 
motives mean the donor relies on the recipient to accomplish pre-determined objectives (Khan, 
2001), and the recipient receives resources which it is unable to provide for itself.  
Country ownership:  
• Involves recipient governments having the 
right, power and legitimacy to set priorities 
and make decisions that are respected by 
the donors;  
• Involves commitment by political 
stakeholders to take responsibility for aid 
funded programs that address an identified 
need; 
• Includes stakeholders in recipient countries 
(government, NGOs and civil society) 
having the capacity to sustain initiatives 
and programs;  
• Consists of recipient governments, political 
actors and donors being accountable to both 
each other  and their citizens, for programs, 
systems and strategies. 
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Therefore, Besson (2009) argues that both the donor and the recipient should exercise the 
power to  define the development and decision-making processes, prioritizing interests and 
determining how initiatives will be implemented and in what direction the development will 
move.  However, this power relationship is not equal, the social and political interests of both 
parties are often different and power moves towards the source of resources, or as Carlos Diaz-
Alejandro, prominent Columbia University professor of Economics, is quoted as saying, ‘if you 
ask for a gift, you must listen to your patron’ (Khan, 2001). 
The Paris and Accra Declarations call on donors to commit to respect and support 
country ownership. This support assumes that the donor will respect the direction of the recipient 
country (de Renzio, 2008), listen to the priorities of governments, assist governments to achieve 
those priorities, and allow governments to make mistakes (Whitfield, 2009). Within this 
flexibility and innovation, donors must also be willing to withdraw aid when the direction and 
processes are inconsistent with what the donor is willing to support (Whitfield, 2009). Best 
(2007) refers to this approach as ‘political pluralism’, the idea that there is more than one way to 
achieve development, that people should have ‘the opportunity to debate those alternatives’ and 
that the one best solution does not have to be determined by the donor. 
Concurrently, recipient countries must have the power to ‘exert meaningful control over 
their decisions and actions’ (Best, 2007). That is, they must have authority. Since ownership is a 
political concept, then in the context of this era of aid effectiveness, the recipient must be the 
legitimate voice of the country, and for whom national development is a key objective (Besson, 
2009; Booth, 2011). The recipient must have the right to set its own development agenda and 
develop strategies and programs to meet the objectives of that agenda (Ghebreyesus, 2010; 
Roderson, 2005). Without this legitimacy, governments will be unable to engender and sustain 
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support and may have to resort to other forms of power such as force or coercion, which may 
achieve a ‘modest degree of implementation in the face of sabotage, indifference, 
nonparticipation, and minimum effort and compliance from the general population, despite large 
expenditure of resources’ (Johnson, 2005). 
The issue of legitimacy in this power dynamic is twofold. Legitimacy (perceived or 
actual) in a recipient country acts as internal social control as the citizens of the country believe 
that the government acts without coercion (Johnson, 2005); and external assurance that 
development goals negotiated with donors will be met (Best, 2007). On the part of the donor, 
there must be the perception that the expertise behind negotiated programs is legitimate, or as 
Best argues ‘its authority is perceived to be justified’ (Best, 2007). Also, there must be the 
perception that the donor is providing objective solutions to problems that the country is seeking 
to resolve (Best, 2007). 
In the context of country ownership, the power that both donor and recipient possess in 
this relationship is tempered by a partnership arrangement. In this partnership, the donor’s power 
serves to enable the objectives of the recipient, not treat them as the ‘means’ or the ‘instrument’ 
to achieve development results (Volker, 2011). This relationship in turn meets the objectives of 
the donor as these objectives are aligned to that of the recipients (Hyden, 2008). 
Commitment and Responsibility 
The value of the Paris and Accra Declarations was the idea of ‘commitment’. The term 
was used over thirty times in the documents to denote the obligation placed on donors and 
recipient alike to the process of aid effectiveness. The Declarations called the donors to respect 
and strengthen country leadership and obliged recipients to develop and implement their own 
national strategies in response to identified and prioritized national needs (OECD, 2005 & 2008).  
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 Castel-Branco (2008) argues that there is a natural link between commitment, 
leadership and control. He argues that ownership in its purest sense includes the recipient 
formulating development agendas free from the influence of the donor and the donor financing 
that agenda, even if the policy preferences are not aligned. Castel-Branco (2008) admits that this 
purist perspective is ‘unrealistic’, and argues that the other end of the spectrum is undesirable as 
well. What he does advocate for is emphasis on the substance rather than the form of the 
ownership; that there should be recipient country commitment to, leadership of and control over 
the development goals, programs and processes to reach those goals. In this way, ‘ownership 
reinforces commitment, and commitment in turn yields results and assures long term 
sustainability’ (Ghebreyesus, 2010). 
With this commitment or right of agenda setting, comes a responsibility. Johnson (2005) 
argues that if a country has the right to insist on deciding its own development agenda without 
coercion, then it is also obliged to take full responsibility for what comes of the policies and 
programs that are implemented. In other words, recipients take responsibility to ‘do or fail to do’ 
(Molund, 2000). They take responsibility for setting the agenda, designing the programs, 
engaging the partners, managing the overall process and accounting for results (Buiter, 2007; 
Health Systems 20/20, 2012). 
This idea of responsibility implies a level of control. Whitfield (2009) introduces an idea 
of ‘ownership as control’. She argues that control can be assessed by observing ‘what proportion 
of the implemented policy agenda was decided by the government; what proportion resulted 
from a compromise between recipient and donor; and what proportion was accepted reluctantly 
as a necessary price to pay for accessing financial aid’ (Whitfield, 2009). Whether or not 
ownership as control is achievable is dependent on the donor-recipient relationship.  
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Molund (2000) presents a legal definition of ownership as right of use, control and 
transfer. He argues that in addition to these objective criteria, there are also subjective criteria of 
necessary ‘attitudes, feelings and opinions’. Boughton (2002) argues that though the ‘state of 
mind’ and ‘internal commitment’ of the national stakeholders is important, and inferences can be 
drawn from observed behavior, there is no way to directly observe this commitment and 
evidence would be incomplete.  While not dismissing these more subjective concepts, he 
suggests more practical signs of commitment can be found in greater control given by the donors 
to recipients over the development agenda in a relationship of trust and empowerment. 
Capacity 
If a recipient is to lead the determination of their policy direction, gain and sustain the 
trust of their donors, and take responsibility for processes and outcomes; and if donors are to 
achieve their development goals, then there must be the recipient capacity to do so (Best, 2007). 
The recipient ‘should have the institutional capacity to develop strategies and operational plans, 
coordinate and align the activities of key stakeholders, implement programs or delegate their 
implementation to others and provide oversight and hold implementers accountable’(Health 
Systems 20/20, 2012).  
Capacity is a complex notion; it includes multiple stakeholders, multiple dimensions and 
multiple levels. For simplicity, capacity can be said to ‘represents the potential for using 
resources effectively and maintaining gains in performance with gradually reduced levels of 
external support’ (LaFond et al, 2003). This definition presents the idea of existing capacity and 
a capacity gap that need to be resolved, and it assumes an internal process that is enhanced or 
accelerated by an external source (Goldberg, 2012). 
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A ‘capacity dilemma’ is at play in the donor recipient-relationship (Best, 2007). 
Recipients who possess the required level of capacity to engage in true ownership are least likely 
to need donor assistance and the recipients for whom leadership, power, authority, and 
engendering respect will be a challenge are the ones most in need of donor assistance and for 
whom ownership of programs and initiatives would be most beneficial (Best, 2007). 
Within this capacity dimension of country ownership, there is a role for donors in 
recognizing the existing capacity and its capability, working with recipients to identify areas for 
improvement or strengthening and integration of donor supported capacity and programs with 
institutional structures and processes(Atun, 2009; de Renzio, 2008)). Donors themselves grapple 
with capacity issues as structural limitations, such as staff turnover and lack of delegation from 
respective headquarters, or the way they deploy their resources, constrain attempts at 
contributing to capacity development (Wood, 2008). But, it is also important for the donor to 
recognize that capacity building requires substantial investment, more than the usual five years, 
from a sustained source (InterAction, 2011; Mas de Xaxas, 2007).  
Further, Sridhar (2009) argues that donors should assist recipients to find sustainable 
solutions to their identified needs and resist developing parallel systems that weaken and neglect 
already inadequate systems, in other words, the expediency of ‘quick wins’ must be replaced by 
‘long-term priority setting and planning’ (Sridhar, 2009). 
Recipients continue to be challenged by both real and perceived capacity constraints and 
the tension between dedicated systems to address the demands of ownership while needing to 
integrate or ‘mainstream’ vertical programming in existing systems (Wood, Kabell, Sagasti, & 
Muwanga, 2008). Therefore, recipients must be flexible in adjusting their national and sub-
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national structures, and be open to alliances and partnerships from civil society and the private 
sector, and be inclusive in planning and oversight processes (Atun, 2009; Mas de Xaxas, 2007).  
Hauck et al (2011) argues that capacity building and ownership are cyclical, self-
perpetuating elements. Ownership is integral to creating capable systems, organizations and 
individuals that are in a constant state of interaction; and this capacity in turn strengthens 
commitment and responsibility for outcomes, both central tenets of ownership.  
Accountability 
Accountability is based on a power dynamic where an agent reports to a principal on 
his/her activities and there are consequences for non-compliance. Easterly (2010) and Sridhar 
(2009) point out that in this dynamic, those with power are not accountable to those with less 
power. 
The Paris and Accra Declarations use the term mutual accountability to describe the joint 
obligation that both the recipient and the donor share in this development process. This 
contemporary view of mutual accountability, assumes a more equal balance of power. It is an 
agreement between recipients and donors, manifested in a sound accountability mechanism, 
including results-based frameworks ‘premised on clear outcome targets that must be defined and 
agreed to the outset’(Ghebreyesus, 2010).  
Monitoring and evaluation of programs and initiatives and results frameworks have 
become a primary focus of accountability structure and the foundation on which other 
accountability activities have been based (Wood, 2008). 
In the area of health, donors and recipients need to place less emphasis on indicator 
reporting and more emphasis on coherent systems of data collection, analysis and use.  Greater 
investment is needed in demographic surveillance and civil registration systems that also 
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addresses chronic, non-communicable diseases while integrating disease-specific initiatives in 
national health systems.  Donors and recipients alike should appreciate that monitoring and 
evaluation goes beyond counting, and investments of time and resources are needed to determine 
causes of morbidity and mortality and the effects of programs in a developing country setting 
(Boerma , 2007; Sridhar, 2009). 
Additionally, Booth (2011) and InterAction (2011) believe the donor should provide 
information on their plans, programs and aid flows to all partners in country. Further, recipients 
must be open to sharing their national budgets as they relate to counterpart funding for 
development initiatives, therefore there is an enhanced parliamentary role in developing and 
accounting for strategies and budgets (Wood, 2008).  
There is an increased demand to account for external funding and the results that funding 
is intended to produce (Boerma, 2007). The challenge of mutual accountability is to ensure that 
the accountability mechanisms implemented in the recipient country serve the purposes of that 
country and not just external accountability (Holzscheiter, 2012). Not only governments but civil 
society and other non-governmental actors are involved in these accountability structures, so that 
accountability and ownership are ‘mutually reinforcing values’ (Germain, 2011; Wright, 2008). 
Discussion 
The objective of this literature review was to define the dimensions of country ownership. 
The results presented ideas on country ownership which  coalesce around four themes, in short, 
power, legitimacy and respect; commitment and responsibility; capacity and accountability. The 
themes are discussed below. 
The literature reviewed in this section demonstrates that country ownership is both an 
essential component in the development process as well as a constructed outcome. The idea of 
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country ownership, expressed as it should be not as it is, seeks after optimal behaviors and 
conditions in a donor-recipient relationship. This literature review does not seek to conclude that 
the donor-recipient relationship is a positive or negative one. The question is; what are the 
norms, behaviors, and inputs that will allow for the achievement of successful and perhaps 
sustainable development outcomes, without questioning the virtues of the relationship or value of 
development aid. It has long been believed that country ownership is critical for a successful 
development result. Nonetheless, each theme identified has inherent challenges that make the 
concept of country ownership complex. 
First, once the idea of power is introduced, intrinsic in that dynamic will be the 
‘powerful’ and the ‘less powerful’ or the ‘powerless’. And certainly once a discussion of a donor 
recipient relationship is broached, this dichotomy of power is even more pronounced. How then 
does the issue of a more balanced share of power in this relationship become practice? Is it 
realistic to expect that there will be power sharing in a relationship defined by power? But can 
ownership be said to exist if the recipient does not exercise power over the process?  
 
• Is it realistic to expect that there 
will be power sharing in a 
relationship defined by power? 
 
• This new paradigm recognizes the 
power of donors but also the right 
of legitimate recipients and 
attempts to define the parameters 
for engagement in this 
relationship. 
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Can a recipient ‘own’ an initiative if they are not the legitimate representative of the 
target constituency? Is there country ownership if the donor does not demonstrate respect for 
recipient leadership, priorities and systems? 
The answers to these questions are the crux of the concept of country ownership. To seek 
greater aid effectiveness and more sustainable outcomes, donors and recipients alike, through the 
Paris and Accra Declarations are articulating a new paradigm of development, in short, a new 
relationship. This new paradigm recognizes the power of donors but also the right of legitimate 
recipients and attempts to define the parameters for engagement in their relationship. 
While Easterly (2010) and Buiter,( 2007) question whether a ‘ruler’ can represent a 
heterogeneous population with ‘conflicting views and interest,’  including the poor of the 
country; and Moyo (2009) points to the donors as the constituents of the recipients in 
contemporary aid relationships; these arguments do not negate the current political practice of an 
elected leader of a country being the legitimate spokesperson for its citizens. And that 
spokesperson has authority over the policies and programs that are implemented in order to 
improve the status of the citizens he/she leads, despite the source of funding. 
 
• Not all development processes and products need 
to be sustainably ‘owned’ 
 
• Commitment and responsibility are not static 
concepts but dynamic and appropriate to the 
initiative 
 
• Some capacity may be needed for ownership to 
thrive as well as the ownership process may 
engender capacity development 
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Second, Johnson (2005) argues that recipients must have a vision for the country that the 
donors ‘buy into’ and that they must be responsible for the successful or failed outcomes of 
development processes and products.  
  As there are many development products and processes that can be ‘owned’, so too can 
there be many levels or layers of ownership. A recipient may only be interested in a given 
product. Does the recipient also have to own the process of developing this product? For 
example, if a country is interested in a Demographic and Health Study does it need to commit to 
and take responsibility for the process when there is no comparable capacity to oversee and 
manage the process? When there is no notion if there will be a need for this study to be repeated 
or if it will be a single activity? Can the recipient trust the partner to undertake the process but 
commit to using or ‘owning’ the results from the study? 
These questions point to the idea that not all development processes and products need to 
be sustainably ‘owned’, perhaps some processes and products need only to be owned for a point 
in time and no more. Therefore, commitment and responsibility are not static concepts but 
dynamic and appropriate to the initiative. As Molund (2000) argues, “the strength of ownership 
depends on two types of circumstances; what the actors want and what they, under prevailing 
circumstances, can do or believe they can do, their desires, preferences, or priorities, on the one 
hand, and their actual and presumed capacities on the other”. 
Which leads to the third challenge; the capacity involved in ownership depends on the 
product being owned and necessary inputs into the process. For example, a process may involve 
the recipient having the capacity to assess the situation in a country and develop a vision for 
change; lead and negotiate the terms of the aid package; have the technical capacity to manage 
and implement an initiative and the ability to funnel the results, if necessary, back into the 
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national processes. Or an initiative may simply require the will and commitment of the recipient, 
while the donor builds capacity for future implementation by the recipient. Therefore, some 
capacity may be needed for ownership to thrive as well as the ownership process may engender 
capacity development. As Goldberg et al (2012) argues, “All organizations must already have 
some level of capacity as a pre-condition to effectively build more capacity”. 
But capacity is not one-sided. The capacity of donors is important in three ways; first the 
donor must have the ability to scan the national environment and twin its global objectives with 
national priorities in a way that is helpful and not disruptive or distortive of national goals 
(Sridhar, 2009); second the donor must be able to provide the resources needed to accomplish 
what it has agreed with the recipient to undertake; and third, the donor must have the ability to 
deliver those resources through adequately staffed offices and appropriate procurement systems 
that are not neglectful of national development processes (Sridhar, 2009). 
 
• It is clear that the idea of accountability is wrapped up in power 
dynamics and whereas the donor has the means of ensuring 
accountability from recipients, the recipients do not have such means. 
 
• Donors have broadly instituted accountability mechanisms and 
recipients have complied with those mechanisms. 
 
• The authors do not dispute the importance of power, legitimacy and 
respect; commitment and responsibility; capacity and accountability; 
rather they argue the practicality of engendering or seeking after these 
dimensions within the current donor recipient environment. 
 
• A theme missing from the systematic search of literature was that of 
financial transition. 
 
• Conceivably, the reason for this absence is explained by the notable 
absence of donor policy papers from this review. 
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Therefore, ‘successful country-owned capacity building projects echo the importance of 
inclusiveness in the planning process and excellent working relationships between partner/donor 
organizations that produce true partnerships’ (Goldberg, 2012).  
Finally, the authors talk about accountability; recipients being accountable to donors, 
recipients being accountable to their citizens, donors being accountable to recipients and also to 
their citizens. It is clear that the idea of accountability is wrapped up in power dynamics and, 
whereas the donor has the means of ensuring accountability from recipients, the recipients do not 
have such means. Therefore, usually missing from the donor recipient accountability process is 
information from the donor (Wood, 2008).  
It may be argued that accountability is a western concept that has little meaning for other 
cultures.  In other words, others cultures may believe that they do not need to be accountable for 
a gift or for something which is now theirs. Nonetheless, even if this perspective is held by 
many, donors have broadly instituted accountability mechanisms and recipients have complied 
with those mechanisms.  
Despite these challenges, country ownership is a theme that endures in the context of 
development aid. There is a logical, and almost inextricable, link between country ownership, 
development financing, technical assistance and successful outcomes of initiatives. The authors 
do not dispute the importance of power, legitimacy and respect; commitment and responsibility; 
capacity and accountability; rather they argue for practicality of engendering or seeking these 
dimensions within the current donor recipient environment. This debate, important and 
cautionary in nature, does not, however, diminish the importance of these dimensions.  
A theme missing from the systematic search of the literature was that of financial 
transition. None of the authors mentioned the long term ability of recipients to provide products 
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or processes for themselves, independent of donor assistance. This neglect is quite a notable 
absence in the discussion as this idea of financial transition is the very essence of development 
aid; that a donor provides resources to a country now, domestic resources and systems are built 
and there is no longer any need for donor assistance. This objective is the epitome of the Chinese 
proverb ‘Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day. Teach a man to fish and you feed him for 
a lifetime’. And it is rooted in the ideology of self-determination (Goldberg, 2012). 
In fall 2012, the US Government made public their Global Health Initiative Interagency 
Paper on Country Ownership. The paper does mention financial transition and does so in the 
context of strengthening local capacity to eventually assume financial responsibility over health 
initiatives. The paper acknowledges that the pace of this transition is dependent on the stage of 
development of the country. 
Nonetheless, the absence of a discussion of financial transition in the literature found 
from the systematic search perhaps indicates that the authors wish to insert some realism in this 
modular concept, may be after 60 years of development aid, they have enough examples to 
demonstrate the development aid is an on-going concern rather than a means to an end. Perhaps 
they discussed the idea of country ownership within the context of contemporary international 
political economy where structural and systemic challenges conspire for developing countries to 
remain ‘un-developed’ (with a few notable exceptions). Or perhaps they delimited their 
discussions to that of donor recipient relationship where the predominant source of funding is the 
donor.  
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Conceivably, the reason for this absence is explained by the dearth of donor policy 
papers. Aside from a published article, Atun & Kazatchkine, (2009), coauthored by Michel 
Kazatchkine, Executive Director of the Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the 
donor voice, captured in their policy documents, is missing from this review. If the donors have 
written on this subject, they have not shared these writings publicly, except for the case of US 
Government Interagency Paper. For other donors, perhaps, this lack of writing, or lack of access 
to documentation, points to a global alignment of thought and ideas around country ownership 
and financial transition.  
Interestingly, the US Government Interagency Paper defines and discusses country 
ownership as a one-sided concept. They include aspects of the dimensions discussed in this 
review, but articulate these dimensions as roles, responsibilities and purview of recipients. They 
discuss the role of the US Government as ‘promoting’, ‘accelerating’ and ‘enhancing’ country 
ownership. While these are important advocacy activities, the paper is silent on the duality of 
responsibility as has been discussed in this review. 
This dual role for the donor and the recipient make the term ‘country ownership’ a 
misnomer.  Power has to be shared; the perception of legitimacy and the attitude of respect have 
• The dual role for the donor and 
the recipient make the term 
‘country ownership’ a 
misnomer.   
 
• Though it suffers from some 
inaccuracy, the terminology is 
useful in its distinctiveness and 
notoriety. 
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to be held by both donor and recipient; commitment, responsibility, capacity and accountability 
are mutual. Therefore, a more accurate concept label would be ‘ownership’ rather than ‘country 
ownership’. So, though the concept label suffers from some inaccuracy, the terminology is useful 
in its distinctiveness and notoriety.  
Limitations of Literature Review 
There are two main limitations of this review.  
First, the perspective of major donors in the form of policy, other papers, and transcripts 
of speeches or conference presentations is limited.  It is unclear whether this limitation is due to a 
lack of public access to these documents or whether there is inadequate individual donor material 
on the issue of country ownership. Further, it is unclear if the documents and comments coming 
from such forums as the Paris and Accra High Level meetings are the agreed and aligned voice 
of the donors and therefore there is no need for individual perspectives. Perhaps the inclusion 
criterion for this review was too narrow to capture these additional sources. Whatever the case, 
the policy perspectives of the major donor countries and organizations is limited. 
Second, the use of UNC’s E-Research Tool may have excluded eligible articles because 
the list of resources that the database searches fluctuates. Initial searches on Google Scholar, 
however, found the same or similar articles to that of the E-Research Tool. Both validated the 
result of the search using the UNC E-Research Tool and negated the use of Google Scholar as a 
value added search method. 
 Additionally, the authors of the literature reviewed were drawn from different 
backgrounds, differing expertise, expressing differing attitudes and beliefs about the concept of 
country ownership; from idealistic to cynical. While one could argue that the absence of a core 
expert opinion is a weakness of the literature selected and therefore this review, one would also 
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argue that the range of opinions and voices added legitimacy and authenticity to a notion that is 
the purview of more than just experts. 
Implications for further study 
Now that dimensions for country ownership have been identified, the next step is to apply 
them to a developing country context where a donor recipient relationship exists.  
Study Design - Part B: Measurement of Country Ownership 
Definitions 
The definitions used in this part of the research are the same as were arrived at through 
the literature review: 
 Country ownership is defined as: 
1. Recipient governments having the right, power and legitimacy to set priorities and make 
decisions that are respected by the donors;  
2. Commitment by political stakeholders to take responsibility for aid funded programs that 
address an identified need; 
3. Recipient stakeholders (government, NGOs and civil society) and donors have the capacity 
to sustain initiatives and programs;  
4. Recipient governments, political actors and donors being accountable to each other  and 
their citizens, for programs, systems and strategies. 
A tool for measuring country ownership of M&E systems is being developed and validated 
by the MEASURE Evaluation Project of the Carolina Population Center. This tool will be 
adapted to measure country ownership of health sector PBF scheme in Lofa County, Liberia. 
Some key differences include: 
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• The original tool is focused on HIV M&E systems while the adapted tool is focused on 
PBF scheme. Therefore, the content and focus is different. For example, the original tool 
includes statements relating to an AIDS Authority while the adapted tool includes 
statements related to the PBF Steering Committee. 
• The original tool includes a statement aimed at determining if a country engages in 
international partnerships for greater impact on the domestic HIV epidemic, while the 
adapted tool does not include this international aspect as the impact of this specific 
application of PBF will likely be felt only in Liberia. 
• The original tool refers to data from different sources (facilities, community or civil 
society and private sector); the adapted tool refers to data from one source, the HMIS. 
A Likert-type scale of ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’ is used for responses to 
questions or statements for the first two dimensions (power, legitimacy and respect and 
commitment and responsibility); and a mix of ‘completely’ to ‘not at all’ and ‘strongly agree’ to 
‘strongly disagree’ for the remaining two dimensions, (capacity and accountability) (see 
Appendix 2).  
The original version of the tool uses a dashboard that aggregates the proportion of responses 
and displays this aggregation to give a pictorial representation of the level of country ownership 
of an M&E system. This dashboard feature is also used to summarize the level of country 
ownership of the PBC system. 
Respondents 
In March and April 2013, the tool was administered to 13 key informants in face-to-face 
interviews. The idea was that data be collected from a minimum of 10 respondents per 
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dimension. Since not all respondents could provide answers to statements in each dimension, a 
total of 13 respondents were needed to achieve the minimum 10 respondents per dimension.  
These key informants were drawn from the MOHSW in Liberia, USAID Mission in 
Liberia; from the Lofa County Health and Social Welfare Team (CHSWT), International Rescue 
Committee (IRC) and selected health facilities in Lofa County.  
The selection of the key informants was based on their knowledge and involvement in the 
health sector PBF at the national and county level and involvement through the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID), the PBF funder of interest. The number of 
respondents reflects the small group of persons with detailed knowledge of the initiation, 
functioning and vision for the PBF scheme in Liberia. Three deputy and assistant Ministers of 
Health represent three health departments in the MOHSW; that is Planning, Administration and 
Health Services. Therefore, even though the majority of respondents were from the MOHSW, 
the selection was deliberate to include a wide cross section of views from the MOHSW.  The 
selection of the facility officers was done to include the impressions of different facilities in 
different health districts in Lofa County in this study. 
Findings 
The study design outlined a decision rule that the PBF process was considered country 
owned if 51% or more of positive (i.e. ‘strongly agreed’, ‘agreed’, ‘completely’ and ‘mostly’) 
responses are achieved in the Power, Legitimacy and Respect and Commitment and 
Responsibility dimensions. In this application, 90% and 83% of positive responses were 
achieved in the Power, Legitimacy and Respect and Commitment and Responsibility 
dimensions; therefore PBF scheme in Lofa County, Liberia can be said to be country owned.  
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In every country ownership dimension, there were statements that respondents selected 
‘no answer’ as the response category. While this category was designed to cover instances when 
a respondent may have been uncomfortable giving a positive or negative reply to selected 
statements; in all instances ‘no answer’ reflected that the respondent did not have sufficient 
information to give their impression of the statement.  
 
Figure 4 - Summary of Country Ownership of the PBF Scheme 
Power, Legitimacy and Respect 
With 90% positive responses, 67% of which were ‘strongly agree’, respondents believed 
that the PBF had a program and budget negotiation process that was balanced between USAID 
and the MOHSW, that there is monitoring of the PBF process and that there is a structure in 
place to manage the PBF process. For only one statement was there two ‘no answer’ responses, 
the statement was ‘USAID and the MOHSW participated in decision making about allocation of 
resources for the PBF scheme’. One of the respondents is a county level actor and was not close 
to the negotiation process and the other was a USAID respondent who was not posted in country 
during the initial PBF scheme negotiation.  For seven of the nine statements in the power, 
legitimacy and respect dimension, different respondents selected the ‘no answer’ response. The 
two statements which had no ‘no answer’ responses, which also had only positive responses 
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were; ‘USAID participated in the last PBF scheme review hosted by the MOHSW’ and ‘there is 
a PBF coordinating Unit’.  
 
Figure 5 – Summary of the Power, Legitimacy and Respect Dimension 
For two statements in this dimension were negative responses selected. One respondent 
disagreed that the PBF scheme is aligned to the national health strategy; S/he reasoned that the 
health strategy and the PBF scheme are not aligned because the scheme is being tested to see if it 
achieves its objective of improving the performance of the health sector. If the objective is 
achieved then the PBF scheme and the health strategy will be more closely aligned. The only 
other disagreement was with the statement ‘USAID made changes in its programming strategies 
in order to effectively support the PBF processes. The respondent argued that his/her response 
hinged on the word ‘effectively’. S/he argued that because of USAID’s regulations of not co-
mingling funds, a separate PBF scheme was set up parallel to the existing scheme funded by the 
Pool Fund. To effectively support the PBF scheme, there should be one approach, one system, 
s/he argues.  
Commitment and Responsibility 
The majority of responses (83%) were positive. Respondents had the impressions that 
there was good strategic and operational planning process and there were known governance 
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structures and processes in place to operationalize the PBF process at the central and county 
levels. For one statement, ‘An organizational chart or similar document defines lines of authority  
and accountability for the PBF in Lofa County’ nearly half the respondents either did not know if 
an organizational chart existed or disagreed that one was developed.  
 
 
Figure 6 – Summary of the Commitment and Responsibility Dimension 
There were five statements that respondents selected ‘no answer’, two of the statements 
by more than one respondent. These were ‘The PBF Coordinating Unit's work plans have 
elements that can be mapped directly to elements of the National Health Strategic Plan’; ‘the 
work plan defines technical and/or cost sharing responsibilities for USAID, MOHSW and other 
partners; ‘IRC and CHSWT have specific plans that are linked to the PBF Operational Plan’; 
‘The PBF Coordinating Unit has institutionalized a set of standards for the PBF scheme that 
conforms to accepted practice’; and ‘An organizational chart or similar document defines lines of 
authority  and accountability for the PBF in Lofa County’. The later statement had the most ‘no 
answer’ responses. 
Of the five different statements that respondents selected ‘disagree’ for, one respondent 
disagreed with four statements; ‘An organizational chart or similar document defines lines of 
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authority  and accountability for the PBF in Lofa County’; ‘There are identified leadership 
structures at the national and county levels with the authority for planning, implementing and 
managing the PBF scheme’; ‘Managers at all levels are held accountable for results’; and 
‘Coordination between partners  is functioning to ensure the successful implementation of the 
PBF scheme’.  
Similarly, there was also one respondent who accounted for five of the twelve ‘no 
answer’ responses selected. He agreed with the four remaining statements in the dimension. 
 Capacity 
The capacity dimension had the greater divergence in views among the respondents. Less 
than half of the responses were positive and there was very little agreement among the 
respondents regarding existing human capacity, capacity building, physical capacity and 
leadership and management of capacity processes. 
 
 
Figure 7– Summary of the Capacity Dimension 
One respondent selected 16 of the 36 ‘no answer’ responses categories in this dimension. 
For the other two statements to which he responded, he selected ‘strongly disagree’. For eight of 
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the statements, the majority of the responses were positives; for seven statements the majority of 
the responses were negative.  
The majority of the respondents agreed that there was an acceptable rate of staff turnover 
at the national level; they agreed  that human capacity to manage the PBF scheme is being built 
through routine supervision and/or on-the-job training and mentorship; they agreed that the 
knowledge, skills and competences were documented; agreed that the PBF unit had adequate 
capacity in core functions; agreed that there was a capacity development plan; agreed that 
external technical support is not required on an ongoing basis to fulfill routine tasks related to 
implementing the PBF scheme which is usually the responsibility of government; agreed 
necessary equipment and supplies were available; and agreed that PBF uses structure processes 
for planning and managing change.  
The majority disagreed that PBF related posts are permanent government posts (i.e. 
establishment posts that are reflected in the entity's official organizational structure and budget) - 
whether filled or vacant posts; disagreed that there are adequate PBF posts at the county level; 
disagreed that human capacity was being built through local colleges, universities and/or 
technical schools in Liberia; disagreed that there is a national database or register of who is 
receiving necessary training to avoid duplication and assure complementarity; disagreed that 
there was basic ICT infrastructure at the central and county levels; disagreed that policies and 
programs are in place to transition the PBF scheme to government only financing; and disagreed 
that the government had a specific budget line item for the proper functioning of PBF units. 
There was ambivalence among the respondents about whether the PBF Coordinating Unit 
has well-established systems for HR planning and management of HR resources and procedures 
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to support current and anticipated levels of staff; and whether there was an acceptable rate of 
staff turnover at the county level. 
If the ‘no answer’ responses were positive or negative, it is unknown if it would affect the 
positive, negative and/or ambivalence impressions of the respondents because of the number of 
possible combinations this change could produce. 
Accountability 
Though not as many positive responses as the Power, Legitimacy and Respect, and 
Commitment and Responsibility dimensions; three quarters of the responses for the 
accountability dimension were positive. 
Respondents had positive impressions of the existing national guidelines and standards, 
that there was information flow and feedback in the PBF scheme and that donor accountability 
and electronic capture and storage of information was functional. For all but one instance in this 
dimension, the majority of respondents positively agreed with the statements. Respondents were 
divided on whether or not staff who submit reports consistently get feedback. 
The selection of the ‘strongly disagree’ category came from two respondents who 
strongly disagreed  that ‘National guidelines exist that document the procedures for recording, 
collecting, collating and reporting  PBF scheme monitoring data’ and that ‘Partners share 
funding levels and staffing information in a timely manner’.  
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Figure 8– Summary of the Accountability Dimension 
Two respondents contributed the majority of the ‘no answer’ responses.  Between the two 
respondents, the two statements that they provided a response other than ‘no answer’ were, 
‘Facilities and partners delivering the same services use standardized data collection and 
reporting forms’ and ‘During previous data auditing visits, all source documents (e.g. completed 
forms) have been available for auditing purposes’. They chose positive responses for both 
statements. 
Result by type of Respondent 
Three types of respondents were included in this study; USAID, the MOHSW and 
County level actors. 
The decision rule of 51% of positive responses in the Power, Legitimacy and Respect and 
Commitment and Responsibility dimensions was also assessed by respondent type. Each of three 
types of respondents interviewed also selected responses that met the decision rule. Therefore, 
each respondent type independently concluded that PBF scheme could be referred to as being 
country owned.  
Results varied when looking at the dimension level: 
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• Power, Legitimacy and Respect - USAID had a more positive impression of the priority 
setting power sharing between them and the MOHSW, than did the MOHSW and the 
County Level actors. Interestingly, the county level actors had a more positive impression 
of the priority setting power sharing than did the MOHSW. Only one respondent, from 
the MOHSW group, selected a negative response to one statement for this dimension. 
 
Figure 9– Comparison of the impressions of the three groups of respondents 
• Commitment and Responsibility - Almost all of the MOHSW’s responses were positive 
(95%), indicating that the MOHSW had a very positive impression of the commitment by 
the MOHSW to take responsibility for the PBF scheme. USAID and the County were less 
positive; the county selected marginally more positive responses (75%) than did USAID 
(70%). 
• Capacity – None of the respondent groups selected above 50% positive responses. 
USAID had the most positive responses of the three types of respondents (45%); the 
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MOHSW and the County were similarly positive (39% and 34%).  However, the 
MOHSW and USAID selected similar numbers of negative responses (45% and 43%). 
The County did not select many negative responses for this dimension (22%) but a third 
of their responses were from the ‘no answer’ category. 
• Accountability – This dimension followed the pattern of all the ‘no answer’ responses for 
all respondents. That is, the further removed from the MOHSW the respondents were, the 
less positive their impression of how accountable the programs, systems and strategies 
are. The negative responses followed the pattern of the country versus external 
respondents. The MOHSW (6%) and the County (16%) selected less negative responses 
than did USAID (26%). 
Discussion 
The level of knowledge of the PBF, reflected in the ‘no answer’ responses did not affect 
the overall assessment of country ownership based on the decision rule. The ‘no answer’ 
responses accounted for 8% of the Power, Legitimacy and Respect responses and 12% of the 
Commitment and Responsibility responses. Therefore, even if the 8% and 12% of ‘no answer’ 
responses were negative responses (‘disagree’ or ‘strongly disagree’), the positive responses 
(‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’) were already more than 50%. 
The only dimension where greater knowledge of the PBF may have made a difference if 
the responses were positive is the Capacity dimension. The positive responses accounted for 46% 
of answers and ‘no answer’, 18%.  
Nonetheless, the level of knowledge of the PBF system is a key finding. Respondents had 
more responses to statements relating to relationship elements between USAID and the MOHSW 
and less responses to statements related to the MOHSW’s capacity to implement the PBF. 
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Interestingly, the respondents selected more negative response categories related to capacity 
statements and less negative response categories related to power, legitimacy and respect 
statements. 
Even though there were some MOHSW respondents who selected ‘no answer’ for some 
of the statements in the tool, it seemed the further removed from the MOHSW the respondents 
were, the more likely they were to have gaps in their knowledge of the PBF scheme. Therefore, 
the county level actors seemed to have the most gaps in information about the PBF scheme 
compared with the MOHSW and USAID.  
The impression of the PBF scheme seemed to be a function of the type of actor. The in 
country actors (MOHSW and County level actors) had a more positive impression of the country 
ownership PBF scheme than the external actors (USAID). Likewise, the in country actors had a 
less negative impression than did the external actors.  
Limitations 
This study has found that the PBF scheme in Lofa County is country owned, but this 
conclusion is not without caveats. The responses are a mix of what exists or may have occurred 
with development and the function of the PBF scheme in Lofa County and the impressions of the 
respondents. Therefore, the measurement approach acknowledges that subjective impressions are 
important for ownership. As Boughton (2002) argues, these subjective impressions are important 
to establish the ‘state of mind’ or ‘internal commitment’ to the aid funded initiative of interest, in 
this case, the PBF scheme.  
Accepting that subjective impressions are critical, the tool mixes subjective and objective 
judgments to promote a systematic understanding of country ownership. Therefore, there is the 
expectation that there will be differences in how national and international actors interviewed 
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view the ownership of the PBF scheme in Lofa County. Is it surprising that USAID thought 
better of the power sharing that the MOHSW? Is it surprising the MOHSW thought better of 
their commitment to and responsibility for the PBF scheme than the donors?  
The second caution relates to one of the inherent disadvantages of using Likert scales, 
that is social desirability bias. Given the focus on performance based financing in Liberia, 
respondents may have felt the need to portray their responses in a more favorable light, rather 
than expressing their honest reactions. Conducting the interviews individually with respondents 
giving reasons why they selected the response category they did, was an attempt to temper this 
bias. 
The third caution is based on the validity of the measure. The country ownership 
measurement approach implemented in Liberia was consistent with the Program Evaluation 
Standards of utility, feasibility, propriety and accuracy as developed by the Joint Committee on 
Standards for Educational Evaluations.(Joint Committee on Standards for Educational 
Evaluations, 2013).  
Even so, does the collection of statements in the tool give a valid description of 
dimensions of country ownership? Does the tool have the right mix of statements? Are there any 
statements that are superfluous? A factor analysis of the statements and responses in the tool 
could answer some of these questions. However, that analysis is outside the scope of this study. 
The conclusion that the PBF scheme is country owned is based on a predetermined 
decision rule that 51% of positive responses should be achieved in two dimensions. Was this 
decision sound? The Power, Legitimacy and Respect, and Commitment and Responsibility 
dimensions are necessary features of country ownership, without these dimensions there could be 
in-country capacity to implement and systems for feedback but no country ownership.  
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The withdrawal of the donor’s support and the absence of national leadership governance 
processes and structures would likely mean the failure of the initiative; indication that the 
initiative was not owned by the donor and/or host country, but the converse is not true. If there 
was limited capacity and feedback systems, but there was donor support and national 
governance, capacity and feedback systems could be built over time. Therefore, it is the 
relationships and the demonstrations of commitment that support the capacity and feedback 
systems that are critical to country ownership. 
Measuring country ownership of the PBF scheme in Lofa County provides an indication 
of the importance of relationships and demonstrations of commitment. Although there are 
significant gaps in the human, physical and long term capacity to implement the scheme, and 
some gaps in the accountability structures; there seems to be a healthy relationship between 
USAID and the MOHSW and commitment on the part of the MOHSW to implement the scheme 
over the long run. The challenge will be having all levels of the system and actors therein, 
capable of sustainably implementing the scheme. This challenge will be explored further in the 
Plan for Change. 
Finally, this measurement approach is more descriptive than prescriptive. Therefore, its 
value is in the conversations that emerge, and the actions that are taken as a result. One could 
argue that objective confirmation of the impressions of the respondents would add a level of 
detachment to the subjective nature of the measurement approach, but does this objectivity add 
value? If the respondents are the ones most intimate with the program or initiative of interest, 
and if these respondents are expressing their subjective impressions, among them lays collective 
objectivity.  
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Therefore, perhaps, what is missing from this application is that opportunity for collective 
confirmation of impressions and the opportunity to discuss remedies to the gaps being 
highlighted. For example, since there was ambivalence about whether there the PBF 
Coordinating Unit has well established systems for HR planning and management, bringing key 
stakeholders together to agree on what the status of the HR and planning systems is would be the 
first step to improving the systems that currently exist or building these systems where they do. 
This opportunity for collective confirmation of impressions will be explored in the Plan for 
Change. 
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CHAPTER 3: AIM 2 - ASSESS IF HEALTH OUTCOMES HAVE IMPROVED IN 
LIBERIA 
 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to first provide evidence of an association between PBCs 
and health outcomes. The chapter, therefore, offers a rational expectation that this association 
can be found in Liberia. Second, four health outcomes from Lofa County in Liberia will be 
examined, before and after the introduction of the PBF scheme to determine if the outcomes have 
improved.  The findings and discussion in this chapter, with the previous chapter’s findings that 
the PBF scheme in Lofa County is country owned, together add to the exploration of the 
connection of country ownership and health outcomes. 
Literature Review 
A literature review was undertaken from January to April 2012 to find evidence that 
PBCs can lead to improved health outcomes. The first key concept examined in this literature 
review was Performance Based Contracting. PBC is an objective means of assessing the 
performance of a partner with whom there is an agreement to produce or deliver a defined 
product or service. It is usually done through the execution of an agreement with a deliverable 
and remuneration (or disincentive) clearly defined for achieving (or not achieving) the 
deliverable. Examples include targeted payments, conditional cash transfers and contracting out 
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health services. The term PBC will be used to represent other like terms, e.g. performance based 
financing, pay for performance and performance based payment. 
 The second key concept examined was health outcomes. Health outcomes focus on 
changes in knowledge, practice, and service coverage for particular aspects of health. One 
example is, women who use a modern method of family planning. 
Search Strategy and Criteria for Selection 
A similar search strategy was used for this literature review as was done with ‘country 
ownership’. First, a general search ‘performance based contracting’ or ‘performance based 
financing’ was used in the UNC’s ‘E-Research Tools’ and an independent search of Wiley 
Online Library was done. 
Publications were included if they were:  
• Scholarly publications including peer reviewed journals  
• Published after June 2005 
• Published in English 
• Provided evidence on the efficacy of PBCs 
• Referred to development aid supported initiatives 
Literature was excluded if the PBC was of a general nature and not specific to health.  
Process for Reviewing Literature 
Articles were reviewed first looking for the search terms (‘performance based 
contracting’ or ‘performance based financing’) in the title of the articles or literature. Abstracts 
of studies were the second point of review before reading the entire article. Where there are no 
abstracts the entire article was reviewed. 
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Literature Review Findings 
Overview  
The search, using two key terms in the UNC E-Research Tool, Google and Wiley Online 
Library; yielded 21 distinct articles.  
  
Figure 10 – PBC Literature Inclusion Process 
Eight articles were excluded because they discussed performance based financing in the 
context of hospital ancillary services and the energy industry in the US, Canada and Italy. 
Therefore, 13 met the inclusion criteria for PBC and were used to discuss the efficacy of PBCs. 
These included three published studies, three systematic reviews, and seven other articles. Two 
of the three studies are included in one of the systematic reviews; resulting in a total of 13 
distinct studies included in this review. These articles discuss PBC in the context of fourteen 
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countries4. Eldridge’s review (2009), offers results of the implementation of the PBC process 
without details of the study or assessment method.  
Study Designs 
The methods used for these studies were randomized control trials (Philippines, Rwanda 
and Cambodia); controlled before-after (Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 
Burundi, Tanzania, Zambia, Bolivia); and interrupted times series (Pakistan, China, Vietnam, 
Rwanda) (Basinga, 2011;Lagarde, 2009; Rusa et al., 2009; Soeters, 2011; Witter, 2012). 
The data analysis method was detailed for only one study. Basinga (2011) reports using 
multivariate regression, with a difference-in-difference model “in which an individual’s income 
is regressed against a dummy variable, indicating whether the facility received P4P [payment for 
performance] that year, facility-fixed effect, a year indicator, and a series of individual and 
household characteristics”. 
Unit of Analysis 
In 11 of the 13 studies, the units of analysis were facilities. The exceptions were in 
Vietnam and China where the units of analysis were physicians and pharmacists. In a Rwanda 
study; a household survey was also conducted to complement the facility data (Basinga, 2011). 
                                                          
4 Countries covered in the material are: Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Bolivia, Pakistan, Cambodia, 
Vietnam, China, Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi, the Philippines, Haiti, Afghanistan and Uganda. 
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PBC Interventions 
The PBC interventions included in the studies were mainly of two types; targeted 
payment e.g. ‘payment for reaching a certain level of coverage, which can be defined in absolute  
Health Outcomes assessed in studies 
Pre-natal care 
• 4+ antenatal visits during pregnancy 
• Number of prenatal care visits in first 
trimester 
• Institutional deliveries 
• Delivery attended by qualified 
provider 
• Tetanus vaccine during pregnancy 
visit 
Family Planning 
• Total family planning consultations – 
total women protected at the end of 
the month 
• Woman in household uses modern 
family planning 
Child Health 
• Children less than 12 months and less 
than 59 months receiving growth 
monitoring consultations 
• Vitamin A supplementation 
HIV&AIDS 
• Heard about HIV and AIDS 
• Voluntary Counseling and Testing per 
population 
Malaria Prevention 
• Household with at least one bed net 
Sanitation 
• Household has latrine in reasonable 
condition 
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terms or relative to a starting point’ (Witter, 2012); and conditional cash transfer, i.e. transfer of 
funds contingent on defined output.  
Eldridge (2009) discusses four models of performance based financing; donor to 
government e.g. Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria; within the public sector 
e.g. in Brazil the central government provided funds to municipalities to increase specific 
services; Government/donor to non-state actors e.g. contracting services to NGOs; and non-state 
provider to health facility or health care worker e.g. NGO supporting a health facility.  
Evidence of the efficacy of PBCs – Improved health outcomes 
Of the 13 studies, nine, covering six countries5, assessed the effect of PBCs on health 
outcomes. In the Rwandan studies, increases in institutional deliveries and child growth 
monitoring or preventative visits were found in the intervention or case heath centers compared 
with the control centers (Basinga, 2011; Rusa, 2009; Soeters, 2011). In the DRC, for persons 
who heard about HIV, improvements in health services utilization, malaria prevention and 
vaccination for children less than 12 months showed significant results in case districts (Soeters, 
2011). In Cambodia, vitamin A supplementation for children was found to have a greater 
increase in case (42%) than the comparison group (23%) (Lagarde, 2009).  
In Bolivia, there was a 24% increase in deliveries attended by health personnel in case 
districts compared to a 14% increase in qualified provider attended births in comparison districts 
(Lagarde, 2009). In Tanzania and Zambia, increases in antenatal care, HIV voluntary counseling 
                                                          
5 Countries where PBC effect on health outcomes was assessed are: Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Burundi, Cambodia, Zambia and Tanzania. 
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and testing and institutional deliveries in intervention facilities were similar to or worse than 
control facilities (Witter, 2012). 
In Haiti, ‘performance based contracting was credited with increasing immunization 
coverage’ from 42% to 74% in children aged 12-24 months and increasing oral rehydration salt 
usage’ (Eldridge, 2009).  
Evidence of the efficacy of PBCs – Other results 
 
The implementation of PBCs had other results. In Rwanda, there was an estimated 
increase of 0.157 standard deviations in prenatal quality (Basinga, 2011); in the DRC, 
perceptions of availability of drugs improved in case districts and declined in control districts 
over time, and revenue from users increased by 25% in case districts and fell by 43% in control 
districts (Soeters, 2011). In Cambodia, there was a 29% increase in the use of public facilities in 
the case group compared to in 8% increase in the comparison group during the study period 
(Lagarde, 2009).  
In Bolivia, in the first phase of the health contracting process, duration of hospital stay 
and bed occupancy rates decreased by 16.2% and 22.3% respectively. In the second phase, the 
trend was reversed and there was an increase in the duration of hospital stay (8.3%) and bed 
occupancy rates (23%) (Lagarde, 2009).  
Patient satisfaction varied across countries and studies; improvements were noted in the 
Philippines and DRC, no change noted in Tanzania and deterioration noted in Burundi (Witter, 
2012). In Uganda, no improvements were found with the intervention group, and the control 
group ‘out-performed those receiving performance based payments on several indicators’ 
(Eldridge, 2009). 
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Biases and Limitations 
The studies were found to be at high risk for bias (Witter, 2012). For many of the studies 
there were no baseline data, the control areas had different characteristics than the intervention 
areas, control sites were chosen retrospectively; the reliability of the outcome indicator was 
questionable (Witter, 2012), and the ‘clusters chosen were limited to enable the randomization 
process to be successful’ (Lagarde, 2009). In Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC, the researchers 
were involved in the design of the intervention (Witter, 2012). For the Pakistan study, the 
information provided was too limited to make an assessment of confounders (Lagarde, 2009). In 
Cambodia, even though there were improvements in health outcomes and health service 
utilization, payments were linked to process indicators such as attendance at work and 
punctuality, and not to health outcomes (Eldridge, 2009). 
Further, there were contextual factors that affected the studies. In a number of countries, 
a policy change coincided with the study period. In Rwanda, the government started a national 
compulsory community health insurance and decentralized the health sector during PBC 
implementation, and user fees were reduced by the health center (Basinga, 2011; Rusa, 2009). 
Since the study did not isolate the effect of reduced user fees and the community health 
insurance, then it is not possible to attribute the growth in the use of services in the Rusa (2009) 
study to the implementation of the PBC. Further, some governments doubled the funding 
available to provinces for PBCs during the study period (Witter, 2012). The Tanzanian study was 
confounded by the abolition of user fees as well as national campaigns that may have increased 
utilization numbers (Witter, 2012). 
In Bolivia, a national insurance scheme was implemented during two phases of the 
hospital contracting; therefore the performance of one phase is not comparable to the second 
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phase.  In the DRC, the facilities used in the studies did not have similar characteristics at 
baseline. Since support to the facilities varied by donor and level of investment, there were clear 
baseline differences that affected the detection of the effect of PBCs (Witter, 2012). 
In Haiti, the effect of other supports (e.g. donor technical assistance, capacity building 
and NGO support) was not isolated from the PBC results. Eldridge posits that the service 
delivery improvements, especially immunization coverage for 12-24 months was so ‘dramatic’ 
that it could not be explained by the payment of bonuses (Eldridge, 2009).  
 
• Enthusiasm for PBCs is 
‘unsubstantiated’ 
 
• PBCs produce side-effects such as 
inequity as a result of ‘cherry-picking’ 
clients’ in a facility and focusing on 
quantity rather than quality 
 
• PBCs allow for decision making to be 
disaggregated to the facility level, 
forces attention on effectiveness of 
roles and responsibilities, increases 
accountability and can improve 
efficiency including addressing 
geographical inequities 
 
• Instead of searching for proof of 
whether PBCs work or not, we should 
instead draw on useful lessons from 
experiences 
 
• PBCs provide a framework for 
thinking through some of the issues 
related to institutional strengthening, 
tangible results, human resource 
development and sustainability 
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In Cambodia, around the time of the implementation of PBCs, the Asian Development 
Bank granted a loan to the Ministry of Health and an international NGO increased the number of 
physicians available. These effects were not controlled for during analysis of the impact of the 
PBCs (Eldridge, 2009).      
Discussion 
Even though the literature presents evidence that links PBCs to improved health 
outcomes, authors are divided on the issue of attributing success to PBCs (Canavan, 2008).  
Ireland (2011) argues that the enthusiasm for PBCs is ‘unsubstantiated’ and proponents make 
“grand claims about its achievements and potential…with very little evidence to support these 
claims”. The opponents argue that it is inefficient because of the increased management burden it 
places on a country and that the one source of credible evidence, Rwanda, is not replicable in 
other settings. Finally, they argue that there is a risk of the PBCs producing side-effects such as 
inequity as a result of ‘cherry-picking’ clients’ in a facility and focusing on quantity rather than 
quality in health service delivery; thus emphasizing financial gain and numbers rather than 
patient-centered care (Ireland, 2011).  
The proponents argue that the history of public health is littered with health initiatives 
that are not underpinned by evidence, but which are rendered no less important than those that 
are evidence based (Basinga, 2011). They suggest that PBCs should not only be seen as a 
provider performance inducement mechanism, but its potential for health system reform should 
not be overlooked (Meessen, 2011). PBCs allow for decision making to be disaggregated to the 
facility level, forces attention on effectiveness of roles and responsibilities, increases 
accountability and can improve efficiency including addressing geographical inequities 
(Meessen, 2011).  
65 
 
Further, the proponents argue that one of the strengths of PBCs is flexibility and that it 
can be a broad approach, with ‘incremental’ but “sensible steps to improving the health system” 
(Soeters, 2011). Therefore, instead of searching for proof of whether PBCs work or not, we 
should instead draw on useful lessons from previous experiences (Macq, 2011). 
In many low income settings, governments contract out health services. This arrangement 
is especially true in fragile or post conflict states. These contracts serve the purpose of rapidly 
responding to the health demands of the country when a government does not have the requisite 
infrastructure or workforce to do so (Palmer, 2006). To transition the capacity for health service 
delivery over to governments, PBCs provide a framework for thinking through some of the 
issues related to institutional strengthening, tangible results, human resource development and 
sustainability (Canavan, 2008). 
Despite the ongoing debate, in 2011, 20 African countries were in the process of 
implementing PBCs (Meessen, 2011).  These data suggest that PBCs are currently seen as a 
viable means of delivering health services and achieving positive results in both service delivery 
and health status in low income settings.  
Implications for further study 
PBCs provide a desirable test case for exploring country ownership’s impact on health 
outcomes because it assumes the use of national systems with recipient decision making 
disaggregated to the facility; funding agreed upon by the donor and recipient, usually supplied by 
the donor; the commitment of the recipient and donor to the terms of the PBC mechanism; 
existing specific contract, output and outcome management capacity with the recipient and 
capacity inputs where there are gaps identified; and PBC specific accountability structures and 
mechanisms by both the recipient and the donor.  
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Although articles discussing PBCs mentioned country ownership, none systematically 
measured or described the PBC process to conclude that they are country-owned. Nor was there 
any literature found that discussed a connection between country-owned PBC and health 
outcomes.  
Study Design – Aim 2 
Definitions 
The definitions used in this research are the same as those used in the literature review: 
 Performance Based Contracting - Performance based contracting is an objective means 
of assessing the performance of a partner with whom there is agreement to produce a defined 
product or service. It is usually done through the execution of an agreement with an output and 
remuneration clearly defined or articulated for achieving (or not) the deliverable.  
 Health Outcomes – Health outcomes focus on changes in knowledge, practice, and 
service coverage for particular health program areas.  
Sample and Measures 
  The study examined four health outcome indicators: 
• Percent of women of children aged less than 24 months whose deliveries were in a facility 
and was attended by a skilled birth attendant  
• Percent of women of children aged less than 24 months who received 2 doses of intermittent 
preventive therapy (IPT) during their last pregnancy 
• Percent of children under 1 year who received DPT3/pentavalent-3 vaccination  
• Percent of women of children aged less than 24 months who completed 4+ antenatal visits 
during their last pregnancy 
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These four indicators, three of which are official Liberian PBF indicators, represent three 
health program areas that are delivered at the health facility level in Liberia. Assessing three 
health areas will provide an indication of whether any improvements are a function of specific 
areas of service delivery, or point to system wide improvements. 
Data for the four selected indicators were drawn from two data sources; Lofa County Lot 
Quality Sampling Survey (LQAS) and the National Health Management Information System 
(HMIS).  
The HMIS in Liberia is a national ‘information system, consisting of various sub‐systems, 
specially designed for data collection, processing, reporting, and use of the information 
necessary for improving health service effectiveness and efficiency through better planning and 
management at all levels of health care delivery systems’ (Liberia MOHSW, 2008). The planned 
components are as follows: 
Services Determinants and Status Resources 
[Information System (IS)] 
• Health Services 
• Disease surveillance 
• Operations Research 
• Community based HIS 
 
• Vital Registration 
• Rapid Assessment 
• Surveys 
• Census 
 
• Human Resources IS 
• Physical Assets 
Infrastructures IS 
• Finance IS 
• Logistics and Supplies IS 
 
In the HMIS, the numerators of the four indicators are counts recorded through the 
facility based IS at service delivery points and the denominator is an estimate of the population 
of interest based on the total population of the county.  
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  The LQAS is a rapid assessment survey with a sample size of no less than 95 
communities, implemented in seven USAID selected counties, one of which is Lofa County. 
Intended as a health outcome monitoring tool for the MOHSW and CHSWT, data are collected 
annually with the counties as primary sampling units. With a sample size of 95 communities, 
there is sufficient power to detect the desired changes from which local stakeholders can make 
programmatic decisions. In Lofa County, the sample size is 114. Six ‘lots’, comprising of a 
health district or groups of health districts, allow for a second level of analysis, useful primarily 
to program managers within each county. This analysis looks at whether the programs 
implemented in a distinct geographical area met predetermined targets set by stakeholders. The 
aggregation of no less than 19 sample points in each ‘lot’ or health district grouping allows for 
the calculation of point estimates and associated confidence intervals for an indicator at the level 
of the primary sampling unit, taking into account ‘lot’ population sizes.  
To assess whether there has been an improvement in health outcomes, a ‘before and after’ 
comparison of the implementation of USAID supported PBC, as well as a trend analysis, was 
done using data as follows: 
• 2010, 2011 and 2012 HMIS; and 
• 2011, 2012, 2013 LQAS for Lofa County.  
Indicators from the two sources are similar but not the same. The HMIS collects facility 
based data and the LQAS study collects community based data. Therefore, even though the 
indicators are similar, there are some differences that should be noted: 
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• HMIS data is facility based data, whereas LQAS is based on a sample survey;  
• For the IPT and 4ANC indicators LQAS includes women who completed a pregnancy, 
whereas the HMIS may also include women who did not complete their pregnancy;  
• For the Penta 3 indicator, LQAS includes a sample of children aged 12 – 23 months, 
whereas the HMIS includes an estimate of the under 12 months population in the county; 
Figure 11 – Definitions of the Health Outcome Indicators  
For the SBA indicator, LQAS includes a sample of the mothers of children less than 24 
months, whereas the HMIS includes an estimate of expected deliveries in the county. 
Nonetheless, they both provide a more complete assessment of health outcomes than using 
one data source and provide strong evidence of the status of the selected health programs.  
The study proposal discussed using the Liberia Demography Health Survey (DHS) to provide 
additional contextual information on the improvement in the selected health outcomes. However, 
the DHS data were not available to be included in this study. 
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Data Analysis  
In April 2013, estimates for the four indicators were calculated from counts and 
population estimates obtained from the HMIS for Lofa county. Using the national definitions for 
each indicator, estimates for 2010, 2011 and 2012 were calculated. Estimates were also 
calculated from the 2011, 2012 and 2013 LQAS surveys for Lofa County.  
 
Figure 12– Health Outcome data from HMIS and LQAS 
A one tailed z-test of estimates was performed to test if the 2012 estimate was greater 
than the 2010 estimate for each indicator in the HMIS; and if the 2013 estimate was greater than 
the 2011 estimate for the LQAS study. A p-value was then calculated from the z-score and 
significance assessed at an alpha (α) level of 0.05. 
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Findings 
Between 2010 and 2012, using the HMIS data, there  seemed no increase in the coverage 
of the second dose of IPT among pregnant women, no increase in four or more ANC visits by 
pregnant women and no increase in the coverage of Penta 3 vaccinations for children less than 12 
months. LQAS also found no increase in the IPT2 coverage, the four or more ANC visits and 
Penta 3 vaccinations between 2011 and 2013 studies.  
Even though the calculated estimates for IPT2 and Penta 3 vaccinations and 4+ ANC 
visits suggested no improvement in the estimates from the pre-PBF years to post-PBF years; a z-
test was done because there is difference in the denominator population in the HMIS for each 
year and because the LQAS drew its denominator population from a sample for both years. From 
the results of the z-test, there is not enough statistical evidence to suggest that the 2013 and 2012 
estimates were greater than the 2011 and 2010 estimates. The p-values ranged from 0.08 to 1. 
The differences in point estimates were due to chance alone. Therefore the hypothesis was 
rejected. 
There was an increase in the number of births at a facility being attended by a skilled 
birth attendant reported from both the HMIS and LQAS. However, for only the HMIS was the 
increase significant at an alpha level of 0.05 (p = <0.001). For LQAS, the confidence intervals 
for the 2011 and 2013 estimates overlapped, therefore the true population estimate could have 
lay between the confident intervals for both years. Therefore, the increase in estimates for LQAS 
could be by chance, a function of the sample selection. 
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Discussion and Conclusion 
Despite the differences in how the indicators are calculated from both data sources and 
the differences in the estimates, for three of the four indicators there was no increase in coverage 
between the 2010 and 2013.  
 
Figure 13 – Trend Graphs for Health Outcome data 
These findings demonstrate that the trends in coverage of the three program areas; 
maternal health, child health and malaria are similar, signaling that the conditions for service 
delivery are similar.  
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The National Health Policy lays out a number of objectives for each of the program areas 
represented by the indicators in this study. Specifically, from 2011 to 2021, the MOHSW seeks 
to: 
• Increase by 50 percent the number of skilled attendants at all levels of the health care 
delivery system  
• Increase the use of Intermittent Preventive Treatment (IPT) among pregnant women in 
Liberia to 80 percent by 31 December 2010 and sustain this coverage level through 2021 
The coverage of DPT/Penta 3 in children less than 12 months has a goal of a 16% absolute 
increase by 2021. There is no mention in the National Policy and Plan of a specific goal for 
antenatal visits for pregnant women. However, the objective of increasing the number of skilled 
attendants at all levels of the health care system assumes a focus on the antenatal visits for 
pregnant women. 
Therefore, while there is an increase in the births attended by skilled birth attendants and not 
in the other program areas, it is not the result of policy focus. Rather, it could be argued that it is 
the result of how the services were incentivized and delivered. 
Limitations 
There are two key limitations to the study methodology for Aim 2. First, there are data 
quality issues inherent in each of the data sources. For LQAS, recall bias could affect the 
responses. Although the study followed the standard protocol of selecting mothers of children 
aged less than 24 months for the ANC 4+ visits, IPT and skilled birth attendant indicators and 
women of children aged between 12 and 23 months for the DPT/Penta 3 indicator; there is still a 
chance that there was recall bias. Of note, recall bias was not an important factor in the method 
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for arriving at the DPT/Penta 3 indicator as the date of vaccination and the child’s birth date was 
confirmed by a child health card in over 90% of respondents. 
For the HMIS, a study conducted by the RBHS project in 2012 found that only 75% of 
complete reports were submitted in Lofa County in 2012 and data accuracy ranges from 38% in 
August 2011 to 46% in February 2012 (RBHS, 2012)6. 
However, despite these data issues, data from both sources are largely trending similarly. 
The second limitation is more of a caution in interpreting the data than a limitation of the 
study. There is a focus by the MOHSW on maternal and child health and malaria; therefore, 
there are resources that are being channeled to these programs. So there is the expectation of 
change in the coverage of services. However, there are behavioral elements inherent in many of 
the services represented by these indicators that are difficult to change in the short term. Women 
have to come to a health facility for their antenatal visits, to receive IPT doses and to be 
delivered by a skilled birth attendant. This circumstance is less the case with immunization, 
where there is a community outreach component. Therefore, caution should be taken when 
interpreting these data, as there is more than health facility service availability considered when 
estimating service coverage. 
                                                          
6 A Performance of Routine Information System Management (PRISM) Assessment was conducted in 2012. This 
assessment measures RHIS performance output, processes, and determinants as well as their relationships. RHIS 
processes have seven components that are crucial for strengthening the technical, behavioral and organizational 
components of any information system. The technical components consist of data collection, data transmission, data 
processing, data analysis, data display, data quality checking, and feedback. The behavioral factors consist of 
perception of information process vis-à-vis personal values and skills. Organizational components include 
organization structure, resources, procedures, support services, and culture to develop, manage, and improve RHIS 
processes. (RBHS, 2012) 
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CHAPTER 4: AIM 3 – DETERMINE INTERVENING VARIABLES THAT COULD 
TEST A CONNECTION BETWEEN COUNTRY-OWNED PBCS AND HEALTH 
OUTCOMES 
Introduction 
In chapters 2 and 3, this study found that PBF scheme in Lofa County, Liberia can be 
referred to country owned and most of the selected health outcomes in Lofa County have not 
improved between 2010 and 2013. The purpose of this chapter is to determine intervening 
variables that could be used if researchers wanted to test a connection between the country 
owned PBF scheme in Lofa County (independent variable) and the selected health outcomes 
(dependent variable).  Therefore, this chapter is focused on hypothesis generating rather than 
hypothesis testing. 
Respondents 
A second interview was conducted with seven of the 13 key informants interviewed in 
Aim 1. Six of the seven key informants were chosen by the researcher based on the least number 
of ‘no answer’ responses to the Country Ownership Tool, therefore, the researcher’s assessment 
of their ability to provide responses to the questions in the second interview. In the case of the 
USAID respondents, the researcher determined, based on responses in the first interview that two 
respondents would provide sufficient information for the second interview. 
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In the case of the county level actors, the selection of the respondent was based not on the 
number of ‘no answers’ but on convenience. The interviews for Aim 1 were conducted in Lofa 
County but after several scheduling attempts, a follow up visit to Lofa County was not possible. 
Therefore, the respondents residing in the county were not included in the Aim 3 interviews. 
For the respondents interviewed, they were presented with the analysis of the health 
outcomes, shown the summary dashboard of their responses to the country ownership tool, and 
shown the aggregated summary from all key informants interviews. They were then asked 
questions to elicit their perception of how the country owned PBC system may be connected to 
the status of health outcomes.  
 
Figure 14 – Summary of Process of data collection and Analysis 
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Analysis Approach 
  Each interview was electronically recorded. These audio records were then transcribed by 
the researcher using Dragon Naturally Speaking after each interview. From this transcription the 
researcher began to get a sense of the recurring themes from the interviews. 
The transcripts were then uploaded to Altas.ti; a qualitative data analysis software. The 
researcher read through all the transcripts and highlighted key sections. These key sections 
pertained to respondents’ explanations of why many of health outcomes had not improved or 
how they thought the element included in the question influenced the health outcomes. These 
highlighted sections became ‘quotes’ in the program and the researcher added comments to the 
quotes to explain why the section was thought to be important. When comments started to be 
repeated and themes started to emerge from the highlighted sections, the researcher created a 
code. 
When all transcripts were read and sections highlighted, the list of quotes and their 
accompanying comments were reread. The researcher created additional codes from recurring 
comments. Additionally, quotes and comments were grouped thematically. When grouping these 
themes, Altas.ti automatically generated additional codes. Codes were reviewed and those with 
nuanced wording were merged e.g. ‘Ministry of Health pre-financing’, ‘FARA’ and ‘pre-
financing’ were merged to one code. The quotes associated with each code were reread several 
times to see if they were coded appropriately. Shifts in code and quotes were done where 
applicable. 
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Findings 
The 16 codes that emerged were further grouped into three primary codes or themes; 
organization of the PBF scheme, finance and management. 
 
Figure 15 – Code Network diagram adapted from Atlas.ti 
These three themes are further elaborated as follows: 
Organization of the PBF 
The organization of the PBF scheme in Lofa County was a major theme of the interviews. 
How the scheme was organized, the roles of different actors and how they worked or were 
supposed to work together, and the existent capacity within the scheme were prominent features 
of the interviews. Responses indicated that the structure of the PBF in Lofa County was a 
function of the existing capacity within the County Health and Social Welfare Team. The 
structure seemed to be a compromise between cost and capacity.  
 
 
The capacity of the counties is so weak that without the support of the 
NGOs, I don’t think we would be able to maintain the outcomes. 
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NGOs were substituted for the gap in county level actors’ skill, competence and 
knowledge to implement the PBF scheme. While acknowledging that there were inadequate and 
delayed training and orientation that would have increased knowledge about the scheme at the 
county level, the respondents cited a lack of oversight, communication and direction by the 
CHSWT as key gaps in the scheme in Lofa. Respondents related this absence of oversight both 
to the structure of and authorities within the PBF to the capacity within the Lofa CHSWT to 
manage the PBF scheme. 
They mentioned that there was no provision of a decentralized structure at the county 
level in the financing of the scheme, therefore if there were dedicated persons at the county level 
who understood the scheme and who were tasked with PBF functions then the results could have 
been different. If this lack was a matter of cost, it was not noted by any of the respondents. The 
roles for different actors were a major point of discussion for the respondents. Not only their 
individual roles but also how they, together, should have an influence on the health outcomes. 
They cited the County Health Boards or Community Health Committees and how it was 
envisioned that they would provide a role as external verifiers of PBF data and how they could 
play a role in the community involvement in the PBF health programs. This role was not in place 
in Lofa at the time of this study.  
The respondents also mentioned the role of the facilities and the facility workers as the 
key conduits of the PBF programs. It did not seem from the interviews that the health facility 
workers knew what their roles were in the scheme and in some cases perhaps were not even 
aware that there was a change in management from the RBHS management scheme to the 
MOHSW managed scheme. 
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The respondents also discussed the role of other units or sections of the MOHSW. The 
respondents mentioned the seeming absence of a mandate by other units of the MOHSW to 
participate in the management of the PBF, therefore the PBF unit had to address issues that were 
outside of their immediate control. And because the PBF unit is not an autonomous entity in the 
MOHSW, it had no authority to marshal or direct the work of other units in order to address 
issues that affect the implementation of the PBF in Lofa. 
 
 
 
Finance 
The respondents discussed the structure of the financing arrangement and how it could 
have influenced the health outcomes. They referred to it as a “complicated way of doing 
business” and a “fundamental problem”. The arrangement of having the MOHSW request funds 
from the Ministry of Finance (MOF), implement activities, reconcile expenditure and then have 
the MOF request a reimbursement from USAID was seen as a big influence on the status of the 
health outcomes. The keys issues surround the availability of funds from the MOF when the 
MOHSW need it and the difference between the funds advanced to the MOHSW and the amount 
reimbursed by USAID, should there be any challenges with program implementation.  
In my mind it is not clear whether an nurse at the facility…can translate how many people I see 
today or over a month, to know how that is contributing to my targets and therefore how I’m being 
paid…I don’t know if the design fits with the level of competence. 
The PBF unit has been tasked with doing all of this…they have made a lot of effort to have units 
provide feedback to the NGOs…Getting the family health division, getting the national malaria 
control program and those other programs to look at the work plan and provide feedback…They 
have done what they could, a lot of it is outside of their control. 
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All the respondents acknowledged that there were disruptive delays in the disbursement 
of funds from the MOF to the MOHSW. These disruptions had many consequences, delays in 
training and orientation; delays in implementation of the PBF Unit’s work plan, service delivery 
and supervision visits, and staff salaries were not paid for two months. Therefore, the result was 
that performance was less than projected. But this had greater influences. 
 
 
 
Management of the PBF  
In many cases, the respondents expressed their uncertainty on whether the structure or 
organization of the PBF scheme or the leadership or management was the greater influence on 
the health outcomes. They point to the fact that the NGO implementing health programs in Lofa 
was working in Lofa County before the start of the MOHSW PBF scheme in 2012. Therefore, 
since there was little change in the program implementation and significant changes in the 
management of that implementation, then respondents focused more on the management of the 
scheme than on implementation. They acknowledge that the change in management from the 
RBHS project to the MOHSW had an impact, and some cited that the management and supply of 
certain commodities such as those for IPT were now being supplied by the MOHSW where they 
were previously managed by the RBHS project. Decisions pertaining to the level of incentives, 
The impact of the lack of funding is a real one, you introduce this system 
and people can’t rely on when they will get their bonuses when they’ve 
earned it. They’re going to lose confidence in the system. 
The government feels that the ministry (of health) is receiving a lot of money from outside. We give them government 
money, then he wants EU money, then he wants FARA money. Use the money first and then come back. But the 
arrangement is not like that, they’re not at the level of implementation, they don’t understand issues that this money is 
supposed to go to contractors to do the work. So for them, they give you money then you go back for EU money and 
then you go back for FARA money, it’s like you have a lot of money just keeping it somewhere. And you have to 
continue to explain to them each time your request for money. Then they say this guy is not serious. 
82 
 
what was incentivized, and how counter verification of PBF results were done, were also factors 
that the respondents cited as influencing the health outcomes.  
Nonetheless, the respondents believed that planning was a factor in the status of the 
health outcomes.  
 
 
 
The respondents note that the planning processes seemed out of ‘sync’ in the beginning, 
that there were many different processes going on at the same time by many different actors in 
the MOHSW. Information was ‘scattered all over the place…and it was difficult to assess where 
you were and what you need to improve’.  
 
Therefore, the work plan, targets and the deliverables were initially less realistic than it 
should have been. However, respondents noted that this improved over time. 
Communication was another key factor that respondents discussed. They noted that there 
were gaps in the information flow within the MOHSW, between the MOHSW and the CHSWT, 
between the NGO and the facilities and between the NGO and the CHSWT. Respondents agreed 
that this was an area that needed improvement.  
Respondents commended the PBF scheme for the monitoring and evaluation systems that 
were implemented. Referring to it as ‘one of the most valuable things’, it was seen as going 
beyond tracking where the incentives go but also tracking the delivery of services. 
You probably would’ve seen a greater decrease in a lot of the indicators if 
the planning wasn’t as good as it was. 
 They [the health facilities] didn’t know about the transition target setting. 
The health facilities didn’t set targets, the NGOs set the targets but the 
strategies to achieve those targets were not discussed with the health 
facilities.  
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Incentives were seen by the respondents as another factor that influenced the health 
outcomes. They questioned the lack of incentivized motivation for the rest of the MOHSW and 
the expectation that they be as responsive as the incentivized sections. They also mentioned that 
there were persons involved in the scheme who viewed the incentives not as a bonus but as part 
of their regular salary.  
 
 
 
Finally, there was some ambivalence about the role of existing infrastructure in the status 
of the health outcomes. Respondents noted the condition of the roads, the lack of consistent 
internet and the absence of computer equipment as contributors to the status of the health 
outcomes. There were some respondents; however, who did not agree that infrastructure played a 
part in the status of the health outcomes. One respondent argued that there was little change in 
the physical infrastructure and therefore the influence on the lack of improvement in most of the 
health outcomes is not important. Another respondent argued that perhaps if the facilities had 
computers they would better be able to track their performance but this also depended on the 
facility workers ability to use the computers. One respondent noted ‘it is one thing to have a 
recording tool and another to know how to use it’. 
Discussion 
Three themes have been distilled from the second interview. Simple but profound, the 
three themes and the sub-themes relate to establishing norms, organizing to implement and 
financing. In some senses, these three themes and sub-themes represent the influence of ‘how’ 
To date, many of the end-use health workers have never fully understood 
the PBF. They knew they got bonuses or not but they never understood 
how it works and how they can ensure they get their bonuses.  
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the PBF scheme is implemented. They speak to the influence of the manner in which norms, 
structures, processes were implemented. 
The connection or relationship between these themes and country ownership is not linear, 
it is complex. Complex connections are characterized by:   
(1) a number of contributing factors,  
(2) recursive causality (e.g., A affects B, and B also affects A) and feedback loops,  
(3) nonlinear relationships,  
(4) multiple causal pathways through the contributing factors – some operating at the 
same time, and different ones operating in different contexts, and  
(5) Unpredictable emergence of some outcomes (Watson-Grant, 2012). 
First, it is clear that there are many contributing factors and many relationship pathways 
operating at different times and in different contexts. That this scheme is being implemented in 
Liberia with its attending challenges of post conflict settings and that this study is being 
conducted less than two years after the start of the PBF scheme in Lofa country are influences 
not to be overlooked. 
Second, all of these intervening variables are dependent on each other or have recursive 
causality. If structures and processes are not articulated and known and if these processes are not 
financed adequately then there is nothing to manage. If there are structures and processes in 
place but no financing, again management is moot. Financing a program that has no structure is 
also unlikely.  
The recursive nature of the variables can also be seen because they are part of or closely 
related to the elements measured in country ownership. The country ownership dimensions 
include all the themes and some sub-themes found in this analysis.  
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As all the intervening variables are interacting together, so too is there a relationship 
between the dimensions of country ownership. Further many of these dimensions and variables 
are also relating to and supporting each other.  Figure 19 maps the themes and sub-themes to 
specific elements in the country ownership dimension. 
Aim 3 themes Elements in Country Ownership Dimensions Country Ownership Dimension 
Capacity of CHSWT 
There are an adequate number of PBF related 
posts at the county level 
Capacity The knowledge, skills and competences for the PBF related posts are documented 
There is an acceptable rate of staff turnover at 
the county level  
Capacity of MOHSW 
The knowledge, skills and competences for the 
PBF related posts are documented 
Capacity 
PBF Coordinating Unit has adequate capacity in 
core functions  (e.g. Technical and monitoring) 
Percentage of full time and/or part time 
government-level PBF related posts filled 
(people currently working) 
There are an adequate number of PBF related 
posts at the county level 
PBF related posts are permanent government 
posts (i.e. establishment posts that are reflected 
in the entity's official organizational structure 
and budget) - whether filled or vacant posts 
There is an acceptable rate of staff turnover at 
the national level  
Communication 
There is an accurate and timely information flow 
between the PBF Coordinating Unit and partners 
 
Accountability 
Finance 
USAID and MOHSW participated in decision-
making about allocation of resources for the 
PBC scheme 
Power, Legitimacy 
and Respect 
Policies programs and resources are in place to 
support capacity building in preparation for a 
transition to government-only financing and 
management Capacity 
There are specific budget line items within the 
national budget to provide adequately for 
functioning PBF units 
Flow of funding Financial resources/investments for PBF are monitored and reported Accountability 
Incentives The work plan defines technical and/or cost sharing responsibilities for USAID, MOHSW 
Commitment and 
Responsibility 
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Aim 3 themes Elements in Country Ownership Dimensions Country Ownership Dimension 
and other partners 
IRC and CHSWT have specific plans that are 
linked to the PBF Operational Plan 
The PBF Coordinating Unit has institutionalized 
a set of standards for the PBF scheme that 
conforms to accepted practice  
Infrastructure/Equipment 
There is basic ICT infrastructure (telephones, 
internet access and email) in place at the national 
and sub-national levels Capacity Necessary equipment and supplies (e.g. 
computers and stationery) are available for a 
functioning system 
M&E 
National guidelines exist that document the 
procedures for recording, collecting, collating 
and reporting  PBF scheme monitoring data  
Accountability 
National guidelines exist that provide 
instructions on how data quality should be 
maintained from the health information 
system(s)   
PBC indicators have been selected according to 
explicit criteria including usefulness, scientific 
soundness, reliability, representativeness, 
feasibility and accessibility 
Facilities and partners delivering the same 
services use standardized data collection and 
reporting forms 
Staff who submit reports consistently get 
feedback.  
There is an accurate and timely information flow 
between the PBF Coordinating Unit and partners 
During previous data auditing visits, all source 
documents (e.g. completed forms) have been 
available for auditing purposes 
Financial resources/investments for PBF are 
monitored and reported  
Database(s) for electronically capturing and 
storing data generated for/by the PBF system is 
functional 
Management 
The PBF coordinating Unit is empowered to take 
action for making adjustments in PBC scheme 
implementation Power, Legitimacy 
and Respect The PBF Coordinating Unit is empowered to 
convene meetings of committees, partners or 
CHWST 
IRC and CHSWT have specific plans that are 
linked to the PBF Operational Plan 
Commitment and 
Responsibility 
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Aim 3 themes Elements in Country Ownership Dimensions Country Ownership Dimension 
The PBF Coordinating Unit has institutionalized 
a set of standards for the PBF scheme that 
conforms to accepted practice  
The PBF Coordinating Unit has processes in 
place for quality assurance and management at 
national, county and facility levels. 
An organizational chart or similar document 
defines lines of authority  and accountability for 
the PBF in Lofa County 
There are identified leadership structures at the 
national and subnational levels with the authority 
for planning, implementing and managing the 
PBF scheme 
Managers at all levels are held accountable for 
results  
Coordination between partners  is functioning to 
ensure the successful implementation of the PBF 
scheme  
Planning 
The PBF Coordinating Unit's work plans have 
elements that can be mapped directly to elements 
of the National Health Strategic Plan Commitment and 
Responsibility The work plan defines technical and/or cost 
sharing responsibilities for USAID, MOHSW 
and other partners 
Role of county health 
boards 
An organizational chart or similar document 
defines lines of authority  and accountability for 
the PBF in Lofa County 
 
There are identified leadership structures at the 
national and subnational levels with the authority 
for planning, implementing and managing the 
PBF scheme 
Commitment and 
Responsibility 
Role of facilities 
Role of NGOs 
Role of parts of 
MOHSW 
Organization of the PBF 
There is a PBC coordinating Unit Power, Legitimacy and Respect 
An organizational chart or similar document 
defines lines of authority  and accountability for 
the PBF in Lofa County Commitment and 
Responsibility There are identified leadership structures at the national and subnational levels with the authority 
for planning, implementing and managing the 
PBF scheme 
Figure 16 – Mapping of Country Ownership dimensions to themes from Aim 3 
In essence, there are no intervening variables. The complex nature of country ownership 
and what it means to have a country owned PBF scheme means that the variables for detecting a 
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connection between a country-owned PBF scheme and health outcomes are already being 
measured within the context of the country ownership of the PBF scheme. 
The measurement approach mixed the concepts of ‘what’ the PBF scheme should include 
and the context in which this inclusion is determined, with ‘how’ the implementation is done. 
Invariably mixing what was previously described as the independent (country ownership of PBF 
scheme) and intervening variables (determined to be management, financing and organization) 
that act upon the dependent variable (health outcomes). 
The definition of country ownership becomes critical in this discussion. The idea of 
country ownership asks what are the norms, behaviors, and inputs that will allow for the 
achievement of successful and perhaps sustainable development outcomes. As was previously 
argued, there is a logical, if not complex, and almost inextricable, link between country 
ownership, development financing, technical assistance and successful outcomes of initiatives.  
Therefore, the job of the researcher is not to measure intervening variables in this link 
between country ownership and health outcomes. The focus instead is on measuring country 
ownership as directly influencing health outcomes. It is important to reiterate that it is unlikely 
these connections can be quantified with precision because the measurement of country 
ownership is qualitative. Therefore, it is inappropriate to discuss an association between the two 
variables or that one causes the other. The connection of country ownership of the PBF scheme 
to health outcomes will remain the collective opinions and impressions of those most familiar 
with the scheme and its results. 
Limitations 
There are two key limitations with the study design of Aim 3.  First, the timing of the 
study affected the results. The interviews were conducted 18 months after the official start of the 
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PBF in Lofa County. Challenges to smooth the transition from RBHS to the MOHSW were to be 
expected. Many of the management processes were new the MOHSW and certainly the financing 
model was one that provided great challenges to MOHSW and its partners. It is likely that if 
similar interviews were conducted three or more years into the implementation of the scheme, 
the responses would be different. But it may also be likely that the PBF scheme would be 
different as well. 
The second limitation is that even though an inductive process of data analysis was used 
to arrive at what could have been the intervening variables, the questions provided a 
predetermined deductive frame. All but one of the questions sought responses to an idea that was 
pre-determined by the researcher based on likely connectors of country ownership to health 
outcomes. The only question that was aimed at giving respondents the opportunity to add any 
other factors they thought influenced the health outcomes tended to be, by the end of the 
interview, a summary and reiteration of their key points. However, this tends to be flaw of 
inductive qualitative interviews in general. 
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CHAPTER 5: CLOSING THOUGHTS - MEASUREMENT OF COUNTRY 
OWNERSHIP AND ITS INFLUENCE ON HEALTH OUTCOMES 
 
From the previous chapters, it is clear that measuring country ownership and attempting 
to link it health outcomes, comes with challenges. These challenges ask two fundamental 
questions: is there value in measuring country ownership and what do we expect this ownership 
to do or affect? 
Albert Einstein once said “Not everything that can be counted counts and not everything 
that counts can be counted”. This study establishes that country ownership ‘counts’ and that even 
though there remain questions, a credible attempt at ‘counting’ country ownership in Lofa 
County was undertaken. What does this attempt at accounting for country ownership tell us? It 
tells us five things. 
First, it tells us measurement is possible. It is possible in very structured and clearly 
defined circumstances. The value of this exercise, of measuring country ownership, is the clarity 
of description and the limited measurement scope. Does this mean that where there is no clarity 
or limitation there can be no measurement? No it does not. As with any measurement activity, 
lack of clarity makes the exercise challenging. Researchers usually have to take a step back, 
discuss with stakeholders their objectives before the measurement activity can begin. It is no 
different with measuring country ownership.  
Second, this measurement exercise unmistakably demonstrated the ‘capacity dilemma’ 
that came from the literature.  The capacity to own the PBF scheme and how capacity is applied 
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to the PBF scheme to engender greater ownership is a multifaceted notion. What this capacity 
dilemma does as well is confirm the essential nature of all four dimensions of the country 
ownership. Capacity is needed for relationships, governance, communication and feedback and 
to implement the initiative. Further, relationships, governance, communication and feedback are 
all individually affecting capacity and as a collective. Therefore, when discussing capacity in the 
context of country ownership, it is important to see it as one of the dimensions of country 
ownership, while bearing in mind its role as facilitator of country ownership.  
Third, the measurement of country ownership raises the question of the usefulness of the 
decision rule for determining country ownership. For study purposes, dichotomizing country 
ownership was done to provide a frame for the theory building exercise of determining 
intervening variables for linking country ownership of PBF scheme to selected health outcomes. 
But is dichotomizing country ownership into ‘exists’ or ‘doesn’t exist’ useful for stakeholders to 
take action? Would it not be better to have a range or continuum where stakeholders can gauge 
progress and continue to refine their actions and interventions to improve health outcomes? It 
seems to be more suitable, in future, to describe an aid funded initiative as having different levels 
of country ownership and focus on actions to move stakeholders from one level to the next. 
Fourth, the measurement approach assumed that only a small number of people knew 
enough about the PBF scheme to respond to the statements in the tool and to think though the 
nuances of how country ownership of the PBF scheme influences health outcomes. This 
assumption was correct. But should conclusions about institutional influences be drawn from 
small number of actors within each institution? If the actors are well positioned, know the 
initiative and can see many of the angles of how the initiative functions, why not? Who but the 
key stakeholders have the knowledge required to draw these conclusions? Are there other 
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perspectives that could be sought from others in the same institutions? Would these perspectives 
be an added value or more voices? For any health funded initiative such as a PBF scheme, there 
will be a small number of people who have detailed knowledge about the initiative. Their 
perspectives on institutional influences of country ownership are appropriate for drawing 
actionable conclusions. 
Fifth, this measurement exercise tells us it is important to accept unsurprising findings. 
Certain ‘truths’ will hold; donors will believe they are participatory and recipients will believe 
the power is imbalanced, recipients will believe they are being responsive and accommodating 
and donors will believe further accommodations should be made. That the measurement 
approach confirms these ‘truths’, does not diminish the value of the tool, it instead adds to the 
richness of the conversations that result.  
One final thought. The assumption of this study and much of the literature is that country 
ownership has a connection to or influences development outcomes, in this case health 
outcomes. This study demonstrates that the description of country ownership considers many of 
the process elements that influence health outcomes. But are outcomes a step removed in the 
results chain and we should instead focus on process outputs? Is it reasonable to expect the donor 
and recipients’ interactions and what those interactions produce to directly affect the knowledge 
and behaviors of targeted populations? Or is the effect more distal? Does it matter if the 
influence is distal or proximal in an exercise that is qualitative and aimed at generating action 
oriented conversations? What value would it add if it were one or the other? It seems that the 
work of thinking on the influences of country ownership has just begun and while further 
thought is needed, this study makes a contribution to both the frame and content of that 
discussion. 
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CHAPTER 6: AIM 4 - PLAN FOR CHANGE 
 
Introduction 
The purpose of the plan for change is to develop strategies to address gaps and limitations 
that the study uncovered. The plan for change outlines next steps that the researcher will 
undertake after the dissertation is presented and accepted by the Dissertation Committee. The 
plan is a demonstrated application of leadership principles and public health policy that the 
researcher learned during the course of the Executive Leadership DrPH Program. 
The plan for change, as outlined in the study proposal, included the following three parts; 
1) recommendations for improving the measurement of country ownership; 2) specific policy 
recommendations for Liberian donors and recipients, in order to improve the ownership of the 
PBF process; and 3) recommended intervening variables for further study of the relationship 
between country ownership of PBC and health outcomes.  
However, given the discussion in Aim 3, there is no need to plan for intervening 
variables. Therefore, the plan for change will include the first two parts. This one plan, 
addressing the two parts will include issues of resources (e.g. people, funds and other resources), 
players (e.g. decision-makers, researchers and other stakeholders) and parameters (e.g. law and 
policy, ethics and authority), where appropriate, and will be framed around selected steps of 
Kotter’s Transformational Change (Kotter, 2007).  
The findings of the study are intended to create a sense of urgency; the first of Kotter’s 
(2007) steps in Transformational Change. The MOHSW has stated that the PBF scheme is the 
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main means of ensuring the delivery of health services in Liberia. This study provides a very 
early discussion of the implementation of the scheme in Lofa County and attention should be 
paid to these gaps in the scheme by the MOHSW, USAID and other stakeholders. 
A stakeholder workshop will be convened with the objective of reviewing the results of 
the all respondents, confirming the findings and discussing the recommendations that come from 
the study.  
Resources Players Parameter 
• People: The researcher 
• Funds: Travel to Liberia and 
Cost of workshop 
• Other resources: n/a 
 
• Decision-makers:  
− Heads of MOHSW 
departments  
− Leads of USAID 
Health Office  
− Other Government of 
Liberia officials (e.g. 
Ministry of Finance) 
• Other stakeholders 
− PBF Unit Personnel 
− Lofa County Staff 
− IRC Country Staff 
• Law and Policy: 
− National Health 
Policy 
− USAID Health 
Strategy  
− National Health 
Policy on 
Contracting 
Figure 17 – Resources, Players and Parameter of the Plan for Change 
During the course of the application of the country ownership tool, the respondents 
highlighted a number of recommendations to improve the ownership of the PBF Process. These 
are listed according to dimensions below.  
 
Power, Legitimacy and Respect 
• Rethink the reimbursement scheme; rationalize the FARA and Pool Fund approaches to PBF; 
have all funds in a common basket 
• Provide ‘seed’ funds for PBF scheme and replenish the funds after liquidation 
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Commitment and Responsibility 
• Clearly outline roles and authorities within the scheme and share this with all stakeholders. 
E.g. County Health Boards and its role as external verifiers of PBF data.  
• Develop a Performance Evaluation Review (PER) system for the MOHSW to have managers 
account for the programs they implement and linking performance to results 
• Establish greater autonomy for the PBF Unit to adjust implementation plans 
• Strengthen and institutionalize collaboration between the NGOs delivering health services 
and the relevant CHSWT 
• Create a stronger link between the NGO and CHSWT’s operational plans 
Capacity 
• Develop a system wide approach to the issue of human capacity in the MOHSW and the 
counties 
• Explore plans for government only financing of the PBF scheme and systematic 
implementation 
• Establish posts for dedicated persons at the county level tasked with PBF functions who 
understand the scheme and can lead activities 
• Improve the situation of health workers by having all appropriate health workers employed 
by the Government of Liberia 
• Develop a long term succession plan, including mentoring of young professionals, to foster 
the eventual movement of mid-level managers to senior management positions 
• Include PBF in graduate level curriculum in universities in Liberia 
• Strengthen the capacity of CHSWTs to implement PBF and the management capabilities at 
the health facility level 
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• Give greater focus to and address staff attrition at the county and health facility levels 
• An assessment of the PBF scheme should be done to outline what inputs are needed to 
enhance the PBF scheme in Liberia 
Accountability 
• Improve timely quality feedback of program results and information flows including the wide 
distribution of the PBF reports 
• Improve transparency of programmatic matters, especially below the senior level at the 
MOHSW  
• Develop guidelines for improving the quality of data  
Second, Kotter (2007) mentions forming a powerful guiding coalition and suggests that many 
entities underestimate change leadership and the importance of strong and powerful process 
leaders. The leadership of the MOHSW and USAID have set the tone for the PBF not only 
through rhetoric, but also in the structures that they have put in place at the MOHSW. However, 
gaps in the leadership remain. There are still leaders of the MOHSW that are key players in the 
PBF scheme, who need to be more engaged and a very particular focus needs to be given to the 
county level actors. If the MOHSW intends, as they have done in other counties, to eventually 
have a ‘contracting in’ model, that is where the MOHSW contracts to the CHSWT and the 
CHSWT sub-contracts services it needs, then a focused capacity plan needs to be developed and 
implemented. As mentioned, this will take leadership at the MOHSW and strong process 
management over the longer term. 
The researcher will use relationships and connections built through this study to encourage 
other decision makers and stakeholders to participate in the workshop. The researcher has 
worked with several of the Assistant Ministers on other activities in Liberia over a number of 
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years and therefore would use that relationship to present this plan and have them use their 
influence to get others to the workshop. This approach is similar to what Yukl (2006) refers to as 
a personal appeal influencing tactic.  
Once the players are at the workshop, the findings of the measurement of the country 
ownership of the PBF scheme would be presented, and a facilitated discussion of the findings 
and recommendations undertaken. Other recommendations would be solicited and an action plan 
for addressing the recommendations developed.  
The approach to be used in the workshop is what Yukl (2006) refers to as consultation 
influence tactic where the facilitator will encourage the participants to suggest improvements in a 
proposal or help plan an activity or change for which the participants’ support and assistance are 
desired.  
Depending on who participates in the workshop, it is likely that the recommendations will be 
implemented. This likelihood is especially the case since the PBF continues to be a focus of the 
MOHSW and its funders, the World Bank started a PBF for hospitals and there are plans for 
expansion of the PBF to other counties in Liberia. The facilitator will have to pay keen attention 
to getting the right participants to the workshop and include implementation or follow up 
responsibility in the discussion. 
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Suggested Core Participants Rationale 
USAID Health Team Leader Primary USAID PBF decision-maker and manager  
MOHSW Chief Medical Officer Responsible for the curative and preventative health services units; including community health services 
MOHSW Deputy Minister for Planning  Provides oversight to the functioning of the CHSWT 
MOHSW Deputy Minister for 
Administration Responsible for MOHSW financial matters 
PBF Unit Manager Manages the day to day functioning of the MOHSW’s PBF Unit 
IRC Country Director Leads IRC’s efforts in Lofa County 
Lofa County Health Officer Leads the Lofa CHSWT 
Figure 18 - Suggested Core Participants at Plan for Change Workshop 
Third, Kotter (2007) argues for communicating the vision and argues that without a 
“sensible vision, transformation effort can easily dissolve into a list of confusing and 
incompatible projects” (Kotter, 2007). It is clear from the second round of interviews that the 
vision for the PBF scheme managed by the MOHSW was not shared widely. More importantly, 
it was not shared with the front line facility workers, those who are implementing the activities 
and do not understand how the scheme functions and what it means to them personally and for 
their work. The recommendation pertaining to strengthening the management capabilities at the 
facility level assumes that the vision for what will be managed will be shared and known. 
Nonetheless, the reiteration of the vision of the PBF scheme in Lofa will be a critical leadership 
activity of the action plan. 
The National Health Policy and the National Health Policy on Contracting both support a 
strong, functional PBF scheme. The National Health Policy outlines key milestones for health 
services that are underpinned and supported by the National Health Policy on Contracting.  The 
Policy on Contracting states that the Government of Liberia is the “provider of last resort for 
health services” (Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, 2008) and therefore contracting will 
provide “efficiencies in the health care system” (Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, 2008). 
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Therefore, that this scheme is country owned is in line with the goals of these policies. USAID’s 
Health Strategy also supports the country ownership of the PBF. While providing technical and 
financial support to the implementation of the MOHSW’s 10 year Health Plan, USAID’s focus is 
on country ownership and integrated health systems (USAID, 2013). Therefore, the policy 
environment is supportive of the workshop proposed and its outputs. 
Fourth, Kotter (2007) argues for empowering others to act on the vision. Respondents 
referred to the limited authority that the PBF Unit at the MOHSW had to implement all that was 
needed for the PBF scheme in Lofa County. They also referred to either a lack of clarity about 
roles or limited execution of those roles. Both these issues are included in the issue of 
empowering others. Kotter (2007) argues that there are a number of issues that could inhibit 
others’ empowerment; organizational structure, compensation that makes them choose between 
self-interest and their work, or inconsistencies in how the program is being implemented makes 
them unsure of where they stand. These are very real obstacles that must be addressed if the PBF 
scheme is to achieve the vision it set for its self, that is “improved health and social welfare 
status and equity in health; therefore becoming a model of post-conflict recovery in the health 
field” (Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, 2008). 
Fifth, Kotter (2007) mentions planning for and creating short term wins and 
consolidating improvements and producing still more change. The MOHSW and USAID are 
engaged in periodically assessing the implementation of the scheme in Lofa. The action plan 
seeks to encourage this practice by prioritizing the tasks in the action plan and using each 
improvement sought to make more change. An example of this assessment is, by strengthening 
the capacity of CHSWTs to implement PBF; it is likely that a stronger link will be created 
between the CHSWT and NGO operational plans.  
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Finally, Kotter (2007) argues for institutionalizing new approaches. He argues that not 
anchoring changes in the organization’s culture is one of the reasons why change is not 
sustained. In some senses, in the case of the MOHSW, creating a new organizational culture and 
anchoring it in that culture is the critical leadership task. Many of the respondents talked about 
the hope that the PBF scheme would change the attitude of health workers and make the delivery 
of health services more results focused. Since there are larger effects being sought by the PBF 
scheme, not just in Lofa County but in Liberia, there are more far reaching issues that need to be 
discussed and addressed. For example, it was noted that the MOHSW hired IRC because the 
Lofa CHSWT lacked the necessary capacity to manage and implement the scheme. To address 
this issue, the broader issues of in country capacity, stable employment with the MOHSW, 
succession planning and responsibility for results needs to be resolved. 
It should be noted that this plan depends on securing funds to travel to Liberia and to host 
the workshop. This study was possible because the researcher travelled to Liberia for another 
research activity and was able to include interviews during her time in country. But the other 
research activity is ending and has limited, shorter travel times planned.  
Whether the proposed workshop can be implemented or not, the researcher plans to make 
copies of the final findings available to USAID and the MOHSW and publish the results in a 
peer reviewed journal. Attempts will also be made to have follow-up discussions with key 
MOHSW and USAID personnel relating to this study. In that way, the findings will be shared 
broadly and actionable discussions will be had. 
101 
 
Timeline for Implementation (February 2014 –December 2014) 
 
Figure 19 – Plan for Change timeline 
Budget 
 
Figure 20 - Budget 
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Limitations of the Study 
One of the key limitations of this study is that the number of key informants interviewed 
is inadequate for qualitative theory development.  While the persons interviewed are the experts 
associated with the implementation of the PBC system in Lofa County in Liberia and best placed 
to assist with determining intervening variables in that context, they do not constitute the breadth 
of available knowledge. 
Further, since this measurement is being done in a very limited setting, the results are not 
generalizable.  The insights gained can be referred to in similar settings but drawing conclusions 
on country ownership of the PBF scheme and using the derived variables in those settings based 
on this study without further study and adaptation is not advised.  
This study will provide another instance of application of the Country Ownership tool 
and therefore provide useful feedback on the validity of its measurement of the concept. But 
again, given the specificities of this application, the use of this tool without further adaption is 
not advised. 
  
  
 
 
Country Ownership Measurement Tool
Thank you for agreeing to meet with me. The purpose of this interview is to measure the level of country ownership of the health sector performance based contracting 
process in Liberia. 
The concept of country ownership, in the context of international development aid, is not a new one. It underpins the provision of international development aid; which 
assumes the following when providing funding: 
1) the products and processes that a donor supports are a priority for developing countries; 
2) that the recipient will participate in the implementation of the initiative;
3) that the recipient will maintain and sustain the products and processes after the donor countries have discontinued their support; 
4) that recipient ownership of an aid funded initiative will lead to more successful outcomes; and 
5) recipients will make decisions and take necessary steps, beyond what is detailed in program documents, to ensure successful outcomes. 
The important elements of understanding country ownership include:  
1) the relationship between donor and recipient; 
2) the transfer of funds from donor to recipient; 
3) the interplay of power, capacity, accountability and responsibility between donor and recipient; and 
4) the intention of creating goods or services to improve the socio-economic situation in a recipient country.
I have developed a definition of country ownership using the dimensions: power, legitmacy and respect; commitment and responsibility; capacity; and accountability. 
I would like to ask you a series of questions to help me assess country ownership of the health sector performance based contracting. Allow me to walk you through how the 
responses will be recorded and summarized.
(Go to next tab and summary tab to show how the tool works)
I will be asking a minimum of nine other key informants to complete this tool.  The responses will collated, and I will summarize them so that individual responses will not be 
evident. I will also be the only person with access to the workbooks with the individual responses.  Through these measures, your response will be kept confidential.
I would like to record our conversation.  Please say if I have your permission to record. Do you  have any questions about what we have discussed so far?
May I proceed?
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USAID MOHSW Lofa County IRC Comments
USAID and MOHSW participated in the design of the performance 
based contracting (PBC) system
PBC framework is aligned to the National Health Strategy and 
USAID's Strategic Assistance document 
USAID made changes in its programming strategies in order to 
effectively support the PBC process 
USAID participated in the last PBC programme review hosted by the 
MOHSW
USAID and MOHSW participated in decision-making about allocation 
of resources for the PBC process
There is a PBC coordinating Unit
The PBC coordinating Unit is empowered to take action for making 
adjustments in PBC program implementation
The PBC Coordinating Unit is empowered to convene meetings of 
committees, partners or CHWST
Country governments have the power and legitimacy to set priorities and make decisions that are respected by the donors
Key Actions/Recommendations
104 
  
 
 
 
USAID MOHSW Lofa County IRC Comments
The PBC Coordinating Unit's work plans have elements that can be mapped 
directly to elements of the National Health Strategic Plan
The work plan defines technical and/or cost sharing responsibilities for 
USAID, MOHSW and other partners
Other partners involved in the PBC process have specific plans that are 
linked to the PBC Operational Plan
The PBC Coordinating Unit has institutionalized a set of standards for the 
PBC program that conforms to accepted practice 
The PBC Coordinating Unit has processes in place for quality assurance and 
management at national, county and facility levels.
An organizational chart or similar document defines lines of authority  and 
accountability for the PBC Coordinating Unit 
There are identified leadership structures at the national and subnational 
levels with the authority for planning, implementing and managing the 
PBC program
Managers at all levels are held accountable for results 
Coordination between MOH and USAID  is functioning to ensure the 
successful implementation of the PBC program 
Key Actions/Recommendations
Commitment by political stakeholders to take responsibility for aid funded programs that address an identified need
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USAID MOHSW Lofa County IRC Facility Comments
1
The knowledge, skills and competences for the PBF related posts are 
documented
2
PBF Coordinating Unit has adequate capacity in core functions  (e.g. 
Technical and monitoring)
3
Percentage of full time and/or part time government-level PBF related 
posts filled (people currently working)
4 There are an adequate number of PBF related posts at the county level
5
PBF related posts are permanent government posts (i.e. establishment 
posts that are reflected in the entity's official organisational structure 
and budget) - whether filled or vacant posts
6
There is a capacity development plan to fill gaps identified in knowledge, 
skills and competences needed to implement the PBF system
7
Human capacity to manage the PBF scheme is being built  through 
colleges, universities and/or technical schools 
8
Human capacity to manage the PBF schemeis being built through routine 
supervision and/or on-the-job training (OJT) and mentorship
9
There is a national database or register of who is receiving necessary 
training to avoid duplication and assure complementarity
10
External  technical support is required on an ongoing basis to fulfill 
routine tasks related to implementing the PBF scheme which is usually 
the responsibility of government
11
There is basic ICT infrastructure (telephones, internet access and email) 
in place at the national and sub-national levels
12
Necessary equipment and supplies (e.g. computers and stationery) are 
available for a functioning system
13
PBF Coordinating Unit uses structured processes for planning and 
managing change 
14
Policies programs and resources are in place to support capacity building 
in preparation for a transition to government-only financing and 
management
15
There are specific budget line items within the national budget to 
provide adequately for functioning PBF units
16
PBF Coordinating Unit has well -established systems for HR planning and 
management of HR resources and procedures to support current and 
anticipated levels of staff
17 There is an acceptable rate of of staff turnover at the national level 
18 There is an acceptable rate of of staff turnover at the county level 
Countries have the capacity to sustain initiatives and programs
Key Actions/Recommendations
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USAID MOHSW Lofa County IRC Facility Comments
National guidelines exist that document the procedures for recording, 
collecting, collating and reporting  PBC programme monitoring data 
National guidelines exist that provide instructions on how data quality should 
be maintained from the health information system(s)  
PBC indicators have been selected according to explicit criteria including 
usefulness, scientific soundness, reliability, representativeness, feasibility 
and accessibility
Facilities and partners delivering the same services use standardized data 
collection and reporting forms
Staff who submit reports consistently get  feedback. 
There is an accurate and timely information flow between the PBC 
Coordinating Unit and partners
During previous data auditing visits, all source documents (e.g. completed 
forms) have been available for auditing purposes
Financial resources/investments for PBC are monitored and reported 
Database(s) for electronically capturing and storing data generated for/by the 
PBC system is functional
USAID shares funding levels and staffing information in a timely manner
Key Actions/Recommendations
Governments and political actors are accountable to both their citizens and donors for programs, systems and strategies
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APPENDIX 2: RESPONSE CATEGORIES FOR THE COUNTRY OWNERSHIP 
MEASUREMENT TOOL 
 
Dimensions Question Numbers Response Categories 
Power, Legitimacy and 
Respect 1-8 
Strongly Agree  
Agree 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
No Answer 
Commitment and 
Responsibility 1-9 
Strongly Agree  
Agree 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
No Answer 
Capacity 
1-2 
&  
4-16 
Completely 
Mostly 
Partly 
Not at all 
No Answer 
3 
76 -100% 
51 - 75% 
26 - 50% 
0% - 25%  
17-18 
Strongly Agree  
Agree 
Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
No Answer 
Accountability 1-7 
Completely 
Mostly 
Partly 
Not at all 
No Answer 
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APPENDIX 3 – AIM 3 INTERVIEW GUIDE 
Thank you for agreeing to speak with me again. Let me remind you of what we spoke of the last 
time we met. I asked you a number of questions that together presented the level of country 
ownership of the health sector performance based financing (PBF) process in Liberia (show the 
tool and the summary of the key informants responses). I asked the same questions of more than 
nine other people and combined all the responses to get a summary of all responses (show the 
master summary sheet).   
Now I would like your opinion on what factors may influence country ownership 
contributing to the current status of health outcomes.  
First, let us take a minute to talk about the health outcomes. Health outcomes focus on 
changes in knowledge, practice, and service coverage for particular health program areas. For the 
purposes of this study I used the following health outcomes: 
• Percent of deliveries that are facility based and attended by a skilled birth attendant 
• Women who completed 4+ antenatal visits during their last pregnancy 
• Women who received 2 doses of intermittent preventive therapy (IPT) during their last 
pregnancy; and 
• Percentage of children under 1 year who received DPT3/ pentavalent 3 vaccination 
These four indicators represent three health program areas that are delivered at the health 
facility level in Liberia. Assessing three health areas will indicate whether any improvements are 
a function of a particular area or point to system-wide improvements. 
By analyzing data, I was able to determine that these health outcomes had (improved, 
declined/showed no change) from 2011 to 2013. Discuss findings. 
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I would like to get your opinion on how country ownership of the health sector performance 
based contracting system may have contributed to these health outcomes. Your response will be 
collated with the other respondents, analyzed and themes identified from the questions asked.  
The information will not be attributed to any one person but will be seen as collective responses.  
I will be the only person with access to notes that identify who provided particular comments, so 
your comments will be confidential. 
I would like to record this interview, please say if I have your permission to record. Do you 
have any questions about what we have discussed so far? 
May I proceed with the questions?  
As we did the last time, let’s start with the first dimension of country ownership: 
Power, Legitimacy and Respect 
1. The model of the PBF process was based on the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare sub-
contracting with implementing partners,  and Lofa County being part of the oversight of 
program delivery. How do you think this model contributed to (improved, declined/showed 
no change) health outcomes? 
Prompts: 
a. What do you think are the factors relating to the model that helped or hindered? 
Central management? Management of government services by IRC? Service 
provision guidance by Lofa county? 
2. Do you think funding decisions affected the achievement of status of health outcomes? If 
yes, how? If no, why? 
Prompts: 
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a. Did it matter that the final decision about budgets came from the MOHSW or 
USAID? 
b. Would implementation have been different if the entity who made the final 
decision was different? How? 
Let’s move on to the next dimension: 
Commitment and Responsibility 
1. In what ways do you think planning by the PBF Coordinating Unit helped or hindered the 
achievement of improved health outcomes? 
Prompts: 
a. Was it their ability or inability to implement according to the plan? 
b. Was it their ability or inability to make adjustments to plans? 
c. Was it because there were (or were not) guidelines for implementing services e.g. 
the PBC Manual? 
d. What do you think could have been done differently, and how might this have 
changed the status of health outcomes? 
2. Would you have organized the PBF structure differently? If so, how? If no, how do you think 
the leadership structures contributed to the health outcomes? 
3. What is your vision of a fully functioning PBF Unit? Could this have contributed differently 
to improved health outcomes?  
4. What are the gaps between your vision and the current set up? 
Let’s move on to the next dimension: 
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Capacity 
1. How do you think the present staff contributed to the status of health outcomes? 
Prompts: 
a. Did you have staff covering each area of implementation? 
b. In your opinion, do you think people were adequately trained? 
c. Could you have gotten more qualified people? 
2. Do you think the existing infrastructure (computers, equipment, internet connection) 
contributed to the status of the health outcomes? 
3. If there was is a plan, what do you think will be the contribution of that plan to improve 
human resources to health outcomes? 
Prompts: 
a. Will it improve the health outcomes? 
b. Will there be no difference because the root cause of the status of health outcomes 
is something else? 
4. In what ways has the leadership and management of human resources contributed to the 
successful implementation of the PBFs? 
Prompts: 
a. Do you think  the leadership and management was proactive? If yes, how? If no, 
why? 
b. Do you think the PBF implementation could have benefited from the leadership 
being more proactive? If yes, how? If no, why? 
c. Do you think the leaders were looking at ways to improve human resources in 
order to successfully implement the PBF system? 
114 
 
Now to the final dimension: 
 
Accountability 
1. Do you think guidance documents and standards were helpful in setting the tone for 
achieving successful implementation of the PBFs? 
Prompts: 
a. From the guidance documents, do you get the impression that PBF Coordinating 
Unit is serious about accountability? Quality of reporting? About the achievement 
of health outcomes? 
2. Do you think adequate information (i.e. budgeting, planning and adjustments in program 
delivery shared in a timely manner) has been shared between all levels of implementation for 
successful achievement of health outcomes? If no, what has hindered the process? If yes, 
what have been some helping factors? 
3. Do you think  resources (i.e. staff, equipment and funding) have been adequate? 
Prompts: 
a. If yes, how do you think this affected the (improved, declined/showed no change) 
health outcomes from 2011 to 2013? 
b. If no, what types of resources were inadequate and what more of existing and 
types of new resources would you need to achieve improved health outcomes? 
c. Ask about deployment of resources (e.g. were the resources deployed in the right 
areas?) 
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Final Comments/Questions 
Are there any additional comments you would like to make on country ownership of the PBF 
system and its relationship to health outcomes? 
Thank you for your time and reflections. I much appreciate it. I will be collating and 
analyzing the responses from the nine other key informants and as soon as the report is 
finalized, I will share it with you. Do you have any questions on this interview? 
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APPENDIX 4: DATA DICTIONARY 
LQAS 
 
Indicator Questionnaire 
# 
Question 
# 
Indicator Calculation 
Percent of mothers of children 
age 0-23 months who 
made/received at least 4 
antenatal care visits during last 
pregnancy 
6 16 
Q 16: Answer = >/4  
(“number of times”) 
 
 
Percent of mothers of children 
age 0-23 months who received 
second dose of IPT for malaria 
during pregnancy 
6 17 & 18 
Q 17: Answer = 1 
(“Yes”) & 
Q 18: Answer = 2 (“no. 
of times SP taken”) 
 
Percent of children age 0-23 
months whose births were in a 
facility and attended by skilled 
birth attendant 
6 25 & 26  
Q 25: Answer = 1, 4 
(“Clinic/Health 
Center/Hospital,” 
“Maternal Waiting 
Home”)  
& 
Q 27: Answer = 1, 2 
(“Doctor”, “Nurse/ 
Midwife”) 
Percent of children age 12-23 
months who received 
DPT3/pentavalent-3 vaccination 
before 12 months (with card and 
without card verification) 
5 
14 & 
11 
 
or 
14 
 
Q 14: Answer =1  
(“Yes, verified on card”) 
+ (“Date of last Penta 
vaccination recorded”) &  
Q 11: Answer = >/24 
months (“Child’s date of 
birth”) 
or 
Q 14: Answer = 2 (“Yes, 
mother says so”) 
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HMIS  
 
Indicator Numerator Denominator 
Women who made/received at 
least 4 antenatal care visits during 
last pregnancy 
Number of women who made 4 or 
more visits to ANC in last month 
5% of the population 
of the county 
 
 
Women who received second dose 
of IPT for malaria during 
pregnancy 
Number of women who received 
2nd dose of IPT in last month 
Expected 
pregnancies  
(5% of the 
population of the 
county) 
 
Women whose births were in a 
facility and attended by skilled 
birth attendant 
Total deliveries in facility by 
skilled birth attendants 
 
Expected deliveries 
Percent of children under 1 year 
who received DPT3/pentavalent-3 
vaccination before 12 months  
Total children under 1 year who 
received DPT3/pentavalent-3 
vaccination 
 
Population of 
children under 1 
(3% of population of 
county) 
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